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Abstract
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense modeling approaches
that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs allow for a hierarchical decomposi-
tion of complex scenarios into simple, easily understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods
based on threat trees and Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security mod-
eling. However there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different
features and goals. The objective of this survey is to present a complete overview of graphical
attack and defense modeling techniques based on DAGs. This consists of summarizing the
existing methodologies, comparing their features and proposing a taxonomy of the described
formalisms. This article also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique de-
pending on user requirements.
1 Introduction
Graphical security models provide a useful method to represent and analyze security scenarios
that examine vulnerabilities of systems and organizations. The great advantage of graph-based
approaches lies in combining user friendly, intuitive, visual features with formal semantics and
algorithms that allow for qualitative and quantitative analysis. Over the course of the last two
decades, graphical approaches attracted the attention of numerous security and formal methods
experts and are quickly becoming a stand-alone research area with dedicated national and inter-
national research projects [14, 17, 241, 263, 273]. Graphical models constitute a valuable support
tool to facilitate threat assessment and risk management of real-life systems. Thus, they have also
become popular in the industrial sector. Notable application domains of graphical models include
security analysis of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [43,257,258], vot-
ing systems [32, 142], vehicular communication systems [4, 97], Internet related attacks [148,261],
secure software engineering [115], and socio-technical attacks [19, 77, 220].
In this paper we focus on graphical methods for analysis of attack and defense scenarios. We
understand attack and defense scenarios in a general sense: they encompass any malicious action
of an attacker who wants to harm or damage another party or its assets as well as any defense
or countermeasure that could be used to prevent or mitigate such malicious actions. In 1991,
Weiss [286] introduced threat logic trees as the first graphical attack modeling technique. The
obvious similarity of threat logic trees to fault trees [270] suggests that graph-based security
modeling has its roots in safety modeling. Weiss’ approach can be seen as the origin of numerous
subsequent models, including attack trees [230,234] which are nowadays one of the most popular
graphical security models.
Today, more than 30 different approaches for analysis of attack and defense scenarios exist.
Most of them extend the original model of threat logic trees in one or several dimensions which
include defensive components, timed and ordered actions, dynamic aspects and different types of
∗The research leading to these results has received funding from the Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg
under the grants C08/IS/26 and PHD-09-167 and the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7/2007 − 2013) under grant agreement number 318003 (TREsPASS).
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quantification. Moreover, methods for computation of various security related parameters, such as
the cost, the impact or likelihood of an attack, the efficiency of necessary protection measures, or
the environmental damage of an attack, have been developed or adapted.
This survey concentrates on formalisms based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), rather than
on arbitrary graphs. Described approaches can be divided into two main classes: formalisms derived
from or extending threat trees, and formalisms based on Bayesian networks. The model creation
in all threat tree-based methodologies starts with the identification of a feared event represented
as the root node. Then, the event’s causes or consequences, depending on the specific approach,
are deduced and depicted as refining nodes. The refinement process is illustrated in Figure 1,
which recreates the first threat tree model proposed by Weiss [286]. The DAG structure allows to
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Figure 1: A threat logic tree taken from [286]: Obtaining administrator privileges on a UNIX
system.
use refinements with a customizable level of detail. The root of a DAG is refined as long as the
refining children provide useful and adequate information about the modeled scenario. Refinements
paired with the acyclic structure allow for modularization which in turn allows different experts
to work in parallel on the same model. This is highly appreciated in case of large-scale, complex
models, where analysis of different parts requires different types of expertise. A big advantage of
the DAG-based approaches is that they are fairly scalable. They do not suffer from the state space
explosion problem, which is common for models based on general graphs with cycles. In the case of
trees, most of the analysis algorithms are linear with respect to the number of nodes of the model.
Due to multiple incoming edges, this property is no longer true for DAGs and the complexity of
analysis methods might in theory be exponential. However in practice, the largest exponent in
the runtime of DAG-based approaches is still acceptable, since it can be kept small due to the
underlying cycle-free structure. This is, for instance, the case for Bayesian inference algorithms
used for the analysis of security models based on Bayesian networks. Figure 2 depicts a simple
Bayesian attack graph borrowed from [213] and illustrates how to compute the unconditional
probability of a vulnerability exploitation.
This paper surveys DAG-based graphical formalisms for attack and defense modeling. These
formalisms provide a systematic, intuitive and practical representation of a large amount of possible
attacks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures, while at the same time allowing for an efficient
formal and quantitative analysis of security scenarios. The contribution of this work is to provide
a complete overview of the field and systematize existing knowledge. More specifically, the survey
• presents the state of the art in the field of DAG-based graphical attack and defense modeling
as of 2012;
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Figure 2: Bayesian attack graph taken from [213]: A test network with local conditional probability
distributions (tables) and updated unconditional probabilities (below each table).
• identifies relevant key aspects allowing to compare different formalisms;
• proposes a taxonomy of the presented approaches, which helps in selecting an appropriate
formalism;
• lays a foundation for future research in the field, with the goal to prevent reinvention of
already existing features.
In Section 2, we introduce terminology used in the field of graph-based security modeling and
provide a template for the description of the formalisms. Section 3 is the main part of the survey
and presents the DAG-based attack and defense modeling approaches published before 2013. In
Section 4, we provide a concise tabular overview of the presented formalisms. We illustrate how to
use the tables in order to select the most relevant modeling technique, depending on the application
requirements. Section 5 briefly mentions alternative graphical security models. We close the survey
with concluding section, which summarizes our findings and proposes future research directions in
the field.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce our terminology and make a link to existing definitions and concepts.
We then present and define the aspects that we have taken into account while analyzing differ-
ent formalisms. We conclude with a detailed description of how formalisms from Section 3 are
described.
2.1 Keywords and Terminology
When examining different models in the same context, it is imperative to have a common language.
Over the last 20 years, numerous concepts and definitions have emerged in the field of graphical
security modeling. This section is intended to introduce the language used in this paper, and to
serve as quick reference guide over the most commonly occurring concepts. Our goal here is not
to point out the differences in definitions or other intricate details.
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Attack and defense modeling By techniques for attack and defense modeling we understand
formalisms that serve for representation and analysis of malicious behavior of an attacker and
allow to reason about possible defending strategies of the attacker’s opponent, called the defender.
In our survey we use attacks in a very broad sense. Attacks can also be thought of as threats,
obstacles, and vulnerabilities. Contrary, defenses can appear in form of protections, mitigations,
responses and countermeasures. They oppose, mitigate or prevent attacks.
Nodes Nodes, also called vertices, are one of the main components of graph-based security
models. They are used to depict the concept that is being modeled. Nodes may represent events,
goals, objectives and actions. Depending on whether the models are constructed in an inductive
or deductive way, nodes may also express causes or consequences.
Root node In a rooted DAG (and therefore in any tree) the root is the single designated node
that does not have any predecessor. From it all other nodes can be reached via a directed path.
This distinguished node usually depicts the entire concept which is being modeled. In the context
of security models, various existing names for this special node include top event, main goal, main
consequence, main objective or main action.
Leaf nodes In a DAG, nodes that do not have any children are called leaves. They usually
display an atomic component of a scenario that is no longer refined. They are also called primary
events, basic components, elementary attacks, elementary components or basic actions.
Edges Edges are the second main component of graph-based security models. They link nodes
with each other, and thusly determine relations between the modeled concepts. Edges are also
called arcs, arrows, or lines. In some models, edges may have special semantics and may detail a
cause-consequence relation, a specialization or some other information.
Connectors Connectors usually specify more preciously how a parent node is connected with
its children. A connector might be a set of edges or a node of a special type. Connectors are also
called refinements or gates. Some examples include: AND, OR, XOR, k-out-of-n, priority AND,
triggers, etc.
Priority AND A priority AND (PAND) is a special kind of AND connector which prescribes
an order in which the nodes are to be treated. The origin of the prescribed order is usually time or
some priority criterion. The PAND is also called an ordered-AND, an O-AND or a sequential AND.
Sometimes the underlying reason behind the priority is specified as in the case of the time-based
AND.
Attributes Attributes represent aspects or properties that are relevant for quantitative analysis
of security models. Examples of attributes, sometimes also called metrics, include: impact of an
attack, costs of necessary defenses, risk associated with an attack etc. Proposed computation
methods range from versatile approaches that can be applied for evaluation of a wide class of
attributes, to specific algorithms developed for particular measures. An example of the former is
the formalization of an attribute domain proposed in [161], which is well suited for calculation of
any attribute whose underlying algebraic structure is a semi-ring. An example of the latter are
the specific methods for probability computation proposed in [296].
2.2 Examined Aspects
One of the goals of this paper is to provide a classification of existing formalisms for attack and
defense modeling. Thus, all approaches described in Section 3 were analyzed based on the same
13 criteria, which we refer to as aspects and define in this section.
The formalisms are grouped according to the following two main aspects:
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1. Attack and/or defense modeling: Attack modeling techniques are focused on an at-
tacker’s actions and vulnerabilities of systems; defense modeling techniques concentrate on
defensive aspects, such as detection, reaction, responses and prevention.
2. Static or sequential approaches: Sequential formalisms take temporal aspects, such as
dynamics time variations, and dependencies between considered actions, such as order or
priority, into account; static approaches cannot model any of such relations.
The above two aspects provide a partition of all considered approaches. Furthermore, they
correspond to questions that a user selecting a suitable formalism is most likely to ask, namely
’What do we want to model?’ and ’How do we want to model?’. The proposed classification allows
a reader to easily make a primary selection and identify which formalisms best fit his needs.
Besides the two main aspects, each formalism is analyzed according to additional criteria, listed
in Table 1. All aspects taken into account in our work, can be grouped into three categories:
• Aspects relating to the formalism’s modeling capabilities, i.e., what we can model: attack or
defense modeling, sequential or static modeling, quantification, main purpose, extensions.
• Aspects relating to the formalism’s characteristics, i.e., how we can model: structure, con-
nectors, formalization.
• Aspects related to the formalism’s maturity and usability: tool availability, case study, ex-
ternal use, paper count, year.
In Table 1, we define all 13 aspects in form of questions and provide possible values that answer
the questions.
Table 1: Table summarizing aspects taken into account in formalism description.
Aspect Aspect Description
Possible
Values
Value Explanation
Attack or
defense
Is the formalism
offensively or
defensively oriented?
Attack Only attack modeling
Defense Only defense modeling
Both Integrates attack and defense modeling
Static or
sequential
Can the formalism deal
with dependencies and
time varying scenarios?
Static
Does not support any
dependencies
Sequential Supports time and order dependencies
Quantification
Can numerical values
be computed using the
formalism?
Versatile
Supports numerous generic and diverse
metrics
Specific
Dedicated, tailored for (a couple of)
specific metrics
No Does not support quantification
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Main purpose
Why was the formalism
invented?
Sec. mod. General security modeling
Unification Unification of existing formalisms
Quantitative
Provide better methods for quantita-
tive analysis
Risk Support risk assessment
Soft. dev. Support secure software development
Int. det.
Automated intrusion detection and re-
sponse analysis
Req. eng.
Support security requirements enginee-
ring
Extensions
What are added
features of the
formalism with respect
to the state of the art?
Structural
New connectors, extended graph struc-
ture
Computa-
tional
How the formalism handles computa-
tions (e.g., top down)
Quantitative
Which computations can be performed
(e.g., specific attributes)
Time
The formalism can handle time depen-
dencies
Order
The formalism can handle order depen-
dencies
New
formalism
Entirely new formalism
Structure
Which graphical
structure is the
formalism based on?
Tree Tree (possibly with repeated nodes)
DAG Directed acyclic graph
Unspecified
It is not specified whether the models
are DAGs or trees
Connectors
What type of
connectors does the
formalism use?
List of
connectors
AND, OR, trigger, sequential AND,
ordered-AND, priority AND, k-out-of-
n, OWA nodes, split gate, countermea-
sures, counter leaves
Formalization
Is the formalism
formally defined?
Formal
Defined using a mathematical frame-
work; with clear syntax and semantics
Semi-formal
Parts of the definitions are given
verbally, parts are precise
Informal Models only verbally described
Tool
availability
Does a software tool
supporting the
formalism exist?
Commercial A commercial software tool exists
Prototype A prototype tool exists
No No implementation exists
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Case study
Do papers or reports
describing case studies
exist?
Real(istic)
Real or realistic case study has been
documented
Toy case
study
Toy case study has been described
No No documented case study exist
External use
Do papers or reports
having a disjoint set of
authors from the
formalism inventors
exist?
Independent
People and institutions who did not in-
vent the formalism have used it
Collaboration
The formalism has been used by exter-
nal researchers and institutions in col-
laboration with its inventors
No
The formalism has only been used by
its inventors or within the institution
where it was invented
Paper count
How many papers on
the formalism exist?
Number
Number of papers that have been iden-
tified1
Year
What year was the
formalism first
published?
Year Before 2013
2.3 Template of the Formalism Descriptions
The description of each formalism presented in Section 3 complies with the following template.
General presentation The first paragraph mentions the name of the formalism and its authors,
as well as lists main papers. The year when the approach was proposed is given. Here we also
present the main purpose for which the technique was introduced. If nothing is indicated about
the formalism structure, it means that it is a generic DAG. If the structure is more specifically a
tree, then it is indicated either in the formalism’s name or in the first paragraph of the description.
Main features In the second paragraph, we briefly explain the main features of the formalism,
in particular what its added features are with respect to the state of the art at the time of
its invention. Moreover, we state whether the modeling technique is formalized, i.e., whether it
complies with proper mathematical definitions.
Quantification Next, we focus on quantitative aspects of the considered methodology. We ex-
plain whether the formalism is tailored for a couple of specific parameters or metrics, or whether a
general framework has been introduced to deal with computations. In the first case, we list relevant
attributes, in the second case, we briefly explain the new algorithms or calculation procedures.
Practical aspects When relevant, we mention industrialized or prototype software tools sup-
porting the described approach. We also indicate when real or realistic scenarios have been modeled
and analyzed with the help of the described approach. In this paragraph, we also refer to large
research projects and Ph.D. theses applying the methodology. This paragraph is optional.
1 Different versions of the same paper (e.g., an official publication and a corresponding technical report) have
been counted as the same publication.
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Additional remarks We finish the formalism description by relating it to follow-up method-
ologies. If it is the case, we point out the formalism’s limitations that have been identified by its
authors or other researchers from the field. In this part we also point out various other peculiarities
related to the formalism. This paragraph is optional.
3 Description of the Formalisms
This section constitutes the main part of this survey. It describes numerous DAG-based approaches
for graphical attack and defense modeling according to the template outlined in Section 2.3.
Models gathered within each subsection are ordered chronologically, with respect to the year of
their introduction.
3.1 Static Modeling of Attacks
3.1.1 Attack Trees
Inspired by research in the reliability area, Weiss [286] in 1991 and Amoroso [9] in 1994 proposed
to adopt a tree-based concept of visual system reliability engineering to security. Today, threat
trees [9, 103, 157, 255, 265], threat logic trees [286], cyber threat trees [193], fault trees for attack
modeling [253], and the attack specification language [261] can be subsumed under attack trees,
which are AND-OR tree structures used in graphical security modeling. The name attack trees
was first mentioned by Salter et al. in 1998 [230] but is often only attributed to Schneier and cited
as [234,235].
In the attack tree formalism, an attacker’s main goal (or a main security threat) is specified
and depicted as the root of a tree. The goal is then disjunctively or conjunctively refined into sub-
goals. The refinement is repeated recursively, until the reached sub-goals represent basic actions.
Basic actions correspond to atomic components, which can easily be understood and quantified.
Disjunctive refinements represent different alternative ways of how a goal can be achieved, whereas
conjunctive refinements depict different steps an attacker needs to take in order to achieve a
goal [218]. In 2005, Mauw and Oostdijk formalize attack trees by defining their semantics and
specifying tree transformations consistent with their framework [161]. Kienzle and Wulf present
an extensive general procedure for tree construction [127] while other researchers are engaged in
describing how to generate attack tree templates using attack patterns [149, 178].
Quantification of security with the help of attack trees is a very active topic of research [288].
A first simple procedure for quantification of attack trees was proposed by Weiss [286] and is
based on a bottom-up algorithm. In this algorithm, values are provided for all leaf nodes and the
tree is traversed from the leaves towards the root in order to compute values of the refined nodes.
Depending on the type of refinement, different functional operators are used to combine the values
of the children. This procedure allows to analyze simple aspects, such as the costs of an attack, the
time of an attack or the necessary skill level [2,9,18,21,43,74,92,97,98,147,161,229,230,234,257,
286,288,296]. Whenever more complicated attributes, such as probability of occurrence, probability
of success, risk or similarity measures are analyzed, additional assumptions, for example mutual
independence of all leaf nodes, are necessary, or methods different from the bottom-up procedure
have to be used [2,31,34,37,38,43,74,97,118,147,156,193,221,226,234,278,296,298]. Propagation
of fuzzy numbers that model fuzzy preference relations has initially been proposed in [25] and
extended in [36]. Using Choquet integrals it is possible to take interactions between nodes into
account.
Commercial software for attack tree modeling, such as SecurITree [7] from Amenaza or At-
tackTree+ [108] from Isograph provides a large database of attack tree templates. Academic tools,
including SeaMonster [171] developed within the SHIELDS project [241] offer visualization and
library support. Attack trees may occur in the SQUARE methodology [168]. The entire method-
ology and therefore visualization of attack trees are supported by the SQUARE tool [248]. At-
tackDog [141] was developed as a prototype software tool for managing and evaluating attack
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trees with voting systems in mind but is believed to be much more widely applicable to eval-
uating security risks in systems [3]. Numerous case studies [4, 30, 43, 44, 48, 50, 77, 80, 84, 92, 93,
97, 98, 125, 142, 148, 158, 164, 165, 168, 178–180, 187, 199, 220, 229, 232, 254, 258, 259, 261, 284, 298]
account for the applicability of the attack tree methodology. Attack trees are used in large inter-
national research projects [81, 241, 263, 266]. They have been focus of various Ph.D. and Master
theses [35, 73, 79, 87, 94, 99, 116,122,126,129,152,177,185,195,196,206,214,217,223,231,233,299].
Since attack trees only focus on static modeling and only take an attacker’s behavior into
account, numerous extensions that include dynamic modeling and a defender’s behavior, exist.
Except for formalisms involving Bayesian inference techniques, all other DAG-based formalisms
refer back to the attack tree methodology. They point out a need for modeling defenses, dynamics,
and ordered actions, as well as propose computation procedures for probability or highly specified
key figures. Neither the name attack trees, nor the initial formalization of Mauw and Oostdijk is
universally accepted. Some researchers consider attack trees, threat trees or fault trees to essentially
be the same [11, 104, 181, 251, 253, 267] while other researchers point out specific differences [147,
174]. As common ground all mentioned methodologies use an AND-OR tree structure but are
divided on what the tree can actually model (attacks, vulnerabilities, threats, failures, etc.)
3.1.2 Augmented Vulnerability Trees
Vulnerability trees [271] have been proposed by Vidalis and Jones in 2003 to support the decision
making process in threat assessment. Vulnerability trees are meant to represent hierarchical inter-
dependence between different vulnerabilities of a system. In 2008, Patel, Graham and Ralston [200]
extended this model to augmented vulnerability trees which combine the concepts of vulnerability
trees, fault tree analysis, attack trees, and cause-consequence diagrams. The aim of augmented
vulnerability trees is to express the financial risk that computer-based information systems face,
in terms of a numeric value, called “degree of security”.
The root of a vulnerability tree is an event that represents a vulnerability; the branches cor-
respond to different ways of exploiting it. The leaves of the tree symbolize steps that an attacker
may perform in order to get to the parent event. The model, which is not formally defined, uses
only AND and OR connectors depicted as logical gates. Vulnerability trees are very similar to
attack trees, they differ in how the root event is defined (vulnerability event vs. an attacker’s
goal). A step-wise methodology consisting of a sequence of six steps is proposed in [200] to create
an augmented vulnerability tree and analyze security related indexes.
The authors of [271] propose a number of attributes on vulnerability trees, including: com-
plexity value (the smaller number of steps that an attacker has to employ in order to achieve his
goal), educational complexity (qualifications that an attacker has to acquire in order to exploit a
given vulnerability), and time necessary to exploit a vulnerability. However, the paper [271] does
not detail how to compute these attributes. In [200], the model is augmented with two indexes:
the threat-impact index and the cyber-vulnerability index. The first index, represented by a value
from [0, 100], expresses the financial impact of a probable cyber threat. The lower the index the
smaller the impact from a successful cyber attack. The second index, also expressed by a value
from [0, 100], represents system flaws or undesirable events that would help an intruder to launch
attacks. The lower this index, the more secure the system is.
In [257], the augmented vulnerability tree approach has been used to evaluate risks posed to a
SCADA system exposed to the mobile and the Internet environment.
3.1.3 Augmented Attack Trees
In 2005, Ray and Poolsappasit2 first published about augmented attack trees to provide a prob-
abilistic measure of how far an attacker has progressed towards compromising the system [219].
This tree-based approach was taken up by H. Wang et al. in 2006 and extended to allow more
flexibility in the probabilistic values provided for the leaf nodes [274]. When again publishing
in 2007, Poolsappasit and Ray used a different definition of augmented attack trees to be able
2In early papers spelled Poolsapassit [212, 219]
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to perform a forensic analysis of log files [212]. Using the second definition of augmented attack
trees, J. Wang et al. performed an analysis of SQL injection attacks [276] and DDoS attacks [275].
They also extended augmented attack trees further to measure the quality of detectability of an
attack [277]. Co-authors of Dewri, namely Poolsappasit and Ray, formalized attack trees as AND-
OR structure where every node is interpreted to answer a specific binary question [65, 66]. This
formalization is then again extended to augmented attack trees by adding to every node an indi-
cator variable and an additional value with the help of which the residual damage is computed.
On the enhanced structure they are able to optimize how to efficiently trade-off between spent
money and residual damage.
The various ways of defining augmented attack trees are based on attack trees (Section 3.1.1).
In the first definition, attack trees are augmented by node labels that quantify the number of
compromised subgoals on the most advanced attack path as well as the least-effort needed to
compromise the subgoal on the most advanced path to be able to compute the probability of
attack [219]. H. Wang et al. generalized this definition from integer values to general weights.
Both approaches include tree pruning and tree trimming algorithms to eliminate irrelevant nodes
with respect to intended operations (behavior) of a user [274]. In the second definition, attack
trees are augmented by descriptive edge labels and attack signatures. Each edge defines an atomic
attack which is described by the label and represents a state transition from a child node to
the corresponding parent. An attack signature is a sequence of groups of incidents, from which a
sequence of incidents can be formed, which executed constitutes an atomic attack. The sequences
are then exploited to filter log files for relevant intrusion incidences [212] and used to describe state
transitions in SQL injection attacks using regular expressions [276]. Moreover they are exploited
to model state transition in DDoS attacks [275] and adapted to provide a measure for quality of
service detection, called quality of detectability [277]. In an extension of the third definition [66]
the system administrator’s dilemma is thoroughly examined. The purpose of this extension is to
be able to compute a bounded minimization of the cost of the security measures while also keeping
the residual damage at a minimum.
Augmented attack trees were designed with a specific quantitative purpose in mind. The first
formalization of augmented attack trees was introduced to compute the probability of a system
being successfully attacked. Additionally to increasing the descriptive capabilities of the method-
ology, the second definition is accompanied by several algorithms that help compute the quality of
detectability in [277]. As mentioned before, the third definition targets solving the system adminis-
trator’s dilemma. This is achieved by using a simplistic cost model a multi-objective optimization
algorithm which guides the optimization process of which security hardening measures best to
employ.
The authors of the first formalism state that attempts by system administrators to protect the
system will not change the outcome of their analysis. A similar shortcoming is suggested for the
second formalization.
3.1.4 OWA Trees
In 2005, Yager proposed to extend the AND and OR nodes used in attack trees by replacing them
with ordered weighted averaging (OWA) nodes. The resulting formalism is called OWA trees [296]
and it forms a general methodology for qualitative and quantitative modeling of attacks.
Regular attack trees make use of two (extreme) operators only: AND (to be used when all
actions need to be fulfilled in order to achieve a given goal) and OR (to be used when the fulfillment
of at least one action is sufficient to reach a desired result). OWA operators represent quantifiers
such as most, some, half of, etc. Thus, OWA trees are well suited to model uncertainty and to
reason about situations where the number of actions that need to be satisfied is unknown. OWA
trees are static in the sense that they do not take interdependencies between nodes into account.
They have been formally defined in [296] using the notion of an OWA weighting vector. Since AND
and OR nodes can be seen as special cases of OWA nodes, mathematically, attack trees form a
subclass of OWA trees. Therefore, algorithms proposed for OWA trees are also suitable for the
analysis of attack trees.
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In [296], Yager provides sound techniques for the evaluation of success probability and cost
attributes on OWA trees. For the probability attribute, he identifies two approaches that can be
explained using two different types of attackers. The first approach assumes that the attacker is
able to try all available actions until he finds one that succeeds. Since in most situations such an
assumption is unrealistic, the author proposes a second model, where an attacker simply chooses
the action with the highest probability of success. Furthermore, [296] presents two algorithms
for computing the success probability attribute: one assumes independent actions which leads to
a simpler calculation procedure, the other can deal with dependent actions. Finally, the author
discusses how to join the two attributes together, in order to correctly compute the cheapest and
most probable attack.
In [25], Bortot, Fedrizzi and Giove proposed the use of Choquet integrals in order to reason
about OWA trees involving dependent actions.
3.1.5 Parallel Model for Multi-Parameter Attack Trees
In 2006, Buldas, Laud, Priisalu, Saarepera and Willemson initiated a series of papers on rational
choice of economically relevant security measures using attack trees. The proposed model is called
multi-parameter attack trees and was first introduced in [31]. Between 2006 and 2010, researchers
from different research institutes in Estonia proposed six follow-up papers [32, 117–119, 186, 289],
extending and improving the original model proposed in [31].
Most of the approaches for quantitative analysis using attack trees, prior to [31], focus on one
specific attribute, e.g., cost or feasibility of an attack. In reality, interactions between different
parameters play an important role. The aim of the mentioned series of papers was to study how
tree computations must be done when several interdependent parameters are considered. The
model of multi-parameter attack trees assumes that the attacker behavior is rational. This means
that attacks are considered unlikely if their costs are greater than the related benefits and that
the attacker always chooses the most profitable way of attacking. The parallel model for multi-
parameter attack trees has been studied in [31,32,116–119]. This model assumes that all elementary
attacks take place simultaneously, thus the attacker does not base his decisions on success or failure
of some of the elementary attacks.
Multi-parameter attack trees concentrate on the attribute called expected attacker’s outcome.
This outcome represents a monetary gain of the attacker and depends on the following parame-
ters: gains of the attacker in case the attack succeeds, costs of the attack, success probability of
the attack, probability of getting caught and expected penalties in case of being caught. First, a
game theoretical model for estimation of the expected attacker’s outcome was proposed by Bul-
das et al. [31], where values of all parameters are considered to be precise point estimates. In [117],
Jürgenson and Willemson extend the computation methods proposed in [31] to the case of interval
estimations. Later it turned out that the computational model from [31] was imprecise and incon-
sistent with the mathematical foundations of attack trees introduced in [161]. Hence, an improved
approach for the parallel attack tree model was proposed by Jürgenson and Willemson [118].
Since this new approach requires exponential running time to determine possible expected out-
come of the attacker, an optimization solution, based on a genetic algorithm for fast approximate
computations, has been proposed by the same authors in [119].
In [32], Buldas and Mägi applied the approach developed in [31] to evaluate the security of
two real e-voting schemes: the Estonian E-voting System in use at the time (EstEVS) and the
Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) performed in the USA in 2004.
A detailed description of this case study is given in the Master thesis of Mägi [152]. A prototype
computer tool supporting the security analysis using the multi-parameter attack trees has been
implemented [12] and described in [13].
In Section 3.2.9, we describe the serial model for multi-parameter attack trees, which extends
the parallel model with an order on the set of elementary components.
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3.1.6 Extended Fault Trees
Extended fault trees were presented by Fovino et al. at the ESREL conference in 2007 [159] and
published in an extended version as a journal paper [88] issued in 2009. The formalism aims at
combining malicious deliberate acts, which are generally captured by attack trees (Section 3.1.1),
and random failures, which are often associated with classical fault trees (Section 3.1.1).
Extended fault trees and attack trees are structurally similar. The main difference between
the two formalisms is in the type of basic events that can be modeled. In EFT basic events can
represent both non-malicious, accidental failures as well as attack steps or security events. Basic
events of attack trees usually correspond to malicious attacker’s actions only. Logical AND and OR
gates are explicitly represented in the same way as in classical fault trees. A step-by-step model
construction process is described in [88], defining how existing fault-trees can be extended with
attack-related components to form extended fault tree models. The modeling technique complies
with proper mathematical foundations, directly issued from fault trees as defined in the safety and
reliability area.
Quantification capabilities are focused on the computation of the probability of occurrence
of the top-event (root node). Generic formulas from fault tree quantitative analysis are recalled
in [88], including treatment of independent or mutually exclusive events. However, no concrete
examples of quantification are provided.
A simple example, analyzing the different failure and attack scenarios leading to the release of
a toxic substance by a chemical plant, is described in [88]. No particular tool has been developed
to support extended fault trees, however, all classical fault tree tools may be used directly.
One of the limitations explicitly stressed by the inventors of extended fault trees is that they
do not take into account time dynamics.
3.2 Sequential Modeling of Attacks
3.2.1 Cryptographic DAGs
Meadows described cryptographic DAGs in 1996 (proceedings published in 1998), in order to
provide a simple representation of an attack process [169]. The purpose of the formalism is limited
to visual description. The attack stages of the overall attack process correspond to the nodes of a
DAG. The difficulty of each stage is shown by a color code. In 1996, the novelty of cryptographic
DAGs was to provide a simple representation technique of sequences and dependencies of attack
steps towards a given attacker’s objective.
From a modeling point of view, each stage (represented as a colored box) contains a textual
description of atomic actions needed for the realization of the stage. Arrows represent depen-
dencies between the boxes. A simple arrow indicates that one stage is needed to realize another
stage. Two arrows fanned out symbolize that one stage enables another one repeatedly. More
generally speaking, cryptographic DAGs are an informal formalism targeted at high level system
descriptions.
Cryptographic DAGs do not support any type of quantification.
Cryptographic DAGs have been used in [169] to demonstrate attacks on cryptographic protocols
(with SSL and Needham-Schroeder scheme as a use-cases), however this representation technique
may be used to model other types of attacks as well.
This formalism allows the representation of sequences of attack steps, and dependencies be-
tween those steps, but cannot capture “static” relations like “AND” and “OR”. Moreover, the clarity
and usability of the models depends heavily on the text inside the boxes, which is not standardized.
3.2.2 Fault Trees for Security
Fault tree analysis was born in 1961 and has initially been developed into a safety, reliability
and risk assessment methodology [107,252,270,285]. A short history of non-security related fault
trees was published by Ericson II [78] in 1999. Fault trees have also been adopted to software
analysis [95,96,145,146] and were even equated with attack trees by Steffen and Schumacher [253].
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In 2003, however, Brooke and Paige adopted fault tree for security, extending the classical AND-OR
structure of attack trees (Section 3.1.1), to include well known concepts from safety analysis [29].
Based on an AND-OR structure, three additional connectors (priority AND, exclusive OR and
inhibit), specific node types (basic, conditioning, undeveloped, external and intermediate) as well
as transfer symbols (transfer in, transfer out) to break up larger trees are adopted from fault tree
analysis in its widest sense. Fault trees for security are an aid to the analysis of security-critical
systems, where first an undesired (root) event is identified. Then, new events are constructed by
inserting connectors that explicitly identify the relationship of the events to each other. Several
rules, like the “no miracle” rule, the “complete the gate” rule and the “no gate to gate” rule
are adopted directly from fault trees. Construction stops when there are no more uncompleted
intermediate events. In the end, a completed fault tree serves as an “attack handbook” by providing
information about the interactions by which a security critical system fails.
In [29], Brooke and Paige state that in computer security “it is difficult to assign useful prob-
abilities to the events”. Consequently probabilistic quantitative analysis is debatable. Instead the
authors recommend to perform risk analysis which answers how the system fails based on the
primary events (leaf nodes).
While [29] only provides a toy example, the authors state that any tool used in fault tree
analysis can be used. They refer to [64] as a good overview of available programs.
3.2.3 Bayesian Networks for Security
Starting in 2004, different researchers proposed, seemingly independently, to adopt Bayesian net-
works, whose origin lies in artificial intelligence, as a security modeling technique [111,184,201,202].
Bayesian networks are also known as belief network or causal network. In Bayesian networks, nodes
represent events or objects and are associated with probabilistic variables. Directed edges represent
causal dependencies between nodes. Mathematical algorithms developed for Bayesian networks are
suited to solve probabilistic questions on DAG structures. They are aimed at keeping the exponent
small when the computing algorithm is exponential and reduce to polynomial algorithms if the
DAG is actually a tree.
According to Qin and Lee, the objective of Bayesian Networks for Security is to “use prob-
abilistic inference techniques to evaluate the likelihood of attack goals(s) and predict potential
upcoming attacks” [218]. They proposed the following procedure that converts an attack tree into
a Bayesian network. Every node in the attack tree is also present in the Bayesian network. An “OR”
relationship from an attack tree is modeled in the Bayesian network with edges pointing from refin-
ing nodes that represent causes into the corresponding refined nodes that represent consequences.
Deviating from regular attack trees, an “AND” relationship is assumed to have an explicit (or
implicit) order in which the actions have to be executed. This allows to model the “AND” relation-
ship by a directed path, which starts from the first (according to the order) child and ends with
the parent node. Dantu et al. follow a different strategy when using Bayesian networks to model
security risk management starting from behavior-based attack graphs3 [58–61]. When process-
ing multi-parameter attack trees with estimated parameter values (Section 3.1.5) Jürgenson and
Willemson use Qin and Lee’s conversion of an attack tree to a Bayesian network [117]. An et al.
propose to add a temporal dimension and to use dynamic Bayesian networks for intrusion detec-
tion without specifying how the graph is set up [10]. Althebyan and Panda use knowledge graphs
and dependency graphs as basis for the construction of a Bayesian network [6]. They analyze a
specific type of insider attack and state that their computational procedures were inspired by
Dantu et al. Another approach involving Bayesian networks is described by Xie et al. who ana-
lyze intrusion detection systems [294]. They state that the key to using Bayesian networks is to
“correctly identify and represent relevant uncertainties” which governs their setup of the Bayesian
network.
3The authors do not appear to make a distinction between attack trees and attack graphs. Since their method-
ology is only applicable to cycle-free structures and they do not mention how to deal with cycles, we assume that
the methodology is actually based on attack DAGs or attack trees.
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Bayesian networks are used to analyze security under uncertainty. The DAG structure is of
great value because it allows to use efficient algorithms. On the one hand there exist efficient
inference algorithms that compute a single query (variable elimination, bucket elimination and
importance, which are actually equivalent according to Pouly and Kohlas [215]) and on the other
hand there are inference algorithms that compute multiple queries at once (bucket tree algorithm
and Lauritzen-Spiegelhalter algorithm). In fact, the efficiency of these algorithms can be seen as
main reason to the success of Bayesian networks, since querying general graphs is an NP-hard
problem [16,24]. Another strength of Bayesian networks is their ability to update the model, i.e.,
compute a posteriori distribution, when new information is available.
We have not found any dedicated tools for analysis of Baysian networks for security. However,
numerous tools exist that allow a visual treatment of standard Bayesian networks. One such tool
is the Graphical Network Interface (GeNIE) that uses the Structural Modeling, Inference, and
Learning Engine (SMILE) [63]. It was, for example, used in [183] to analyze the interoperability
of a very small cluster of services and mentioned as hypothetical use in [89]. Another one, called
MulVal [198], was actually developed for attack graphs (Section 5.2), but used in [294] to implement
a Bayesian network model. A third tool, tailored to statistical learning with Bayesian networks is
bnlearn [236].
There also exist isolated papers that promote the use of Bayesian networks in security without
any relation to attack trees or attack graphs. Houmb et al., quantify security risk level from
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) estimates of frequency and impact using Bayesian
networks [102]. Feng and Xie also use Bayesian networks and provide an algorithm of how to
merge two sources of information, expert knowledge and information stored in databases, into one
graph [83]. Note that in this section we have gathered approaches that rely on Bayesian networks
and where their construction starts from graphs that do not contain any cycles. Graphical models
that make use of Bayesian networks and initially contain cycles are treated in Section 3.2.4, ones
that include defenses are treated in Section 3.4.3.
3.2.4 Bayesian Attack Graphs
Bayesian Attack Graphs combine (general) attack graphs (Section 5.2), with computational pro-
cedures of Bayesian networks (Section 3.2.3). However, since Bayesian inference procedures only
work on cycle-free structures, the formalism includes instructions on how to remove any occurring
cycles. Hence any final Bayesian attack graph is acyclic. After the elimination of cycles, Bayesian
attack graphs model causal relationships between vulnerabilities in the same way as Bayesian
networks (Section 3.2.3) Bayesian attack graphs were first proposed by Liu and Man in order to
analyze network vulnerability scenarios with the help of Bayesian inference methods in 2005 [151].
Therefore the formalism advances computational methods in security where uncertainty is consid-
ered.
The formalism of Man and Liu is not the only fusion of attack graphs and Bayesian networks.
Starting in 2008 a group of researchers including Frigault, Noel, Jajodia and Wang published a
paper on a modified version of Bayesian attack graphs. Their goal was to be able to calculate
general security metrics regarding information system networks which also contain probabilistic
dependencies [90, 192]. Later they extended the formalism, using a second copy of the model as
time slice, to also capture dynamic behavior in so called dynamic Bayesian networks [91]. In 2012,
Poolsappasit et al. revisited the framework to be able to deal with asset identification, system
vulnerability and connectivity analysis as well as mitigation strategies [213].
All three approaches eliminate cycles that possibly exist in the underlying attack graph. A
shortcoming of Liu and Man is that they do not provide a specific procedure on how to achieve
this. The group including Frigault refers to a paper on attack graphs [279] which removes cycles
through an intricate procedure. Poolsappasit et al. state that they rather analyze “why an attack
can happen” and not “how an attack can happen” and therefore, “cycles can be disregarded using
the monotonicity constraint” mentioned in [8].
Since Bayesian attack graphs are cycle-free, evaluation on them can make use of Bayesian infer-
ence techniques. For this it is necessary to provide probabilistic information. The three approaches
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differ in how they compute quantitative values. Liu and Man provide edge probabilities [151],
Frigault et al. give conditional probability tables for nodes which are estimated according to
their CVSS score [90] and Poolsappasit et al. use (local) conditional probability distributions for
nodes [213]. Furthermore, Poolsappasit et al. augment Bayesian attack graphs with additional
nodes and values representing hardening measures (defenses). On the augmented structure they
propose a genetic algorithm that solves a multiobjective optimization problem of how to assess
the risk in a network system and select optimal defenses [213].
The research group including Wang uses a Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) tool [110,
188] to create the attack graphs that serve as basis for constructing Bayesian attack graphs.
Poolsappasit et al. have developed an unreferenced in-house tool that allows them to compute
with conditional probability distributions.
Wang et al. [90,91] state that their work is also based on that of An et al. [10], who use Bayesian
networks without cycles for modeling risks of violating privacy in a database.
3.2.5 Compromise Graphs
McQueen et al. introduced compromise graphs in 2006 [167]. Compromise graphs are based on
directed graphs4, and are used to assess the efficiency of various technical security measures for a
given network architecture. The nodes of a compromise graph represent the phases of an attack,
detailing how a given target can get compromised. The edges are weighted according to the esti-
mated time required to complete the corresponding phase for this compromise. The overall time
needed for the attacker to succeed is computed and compared along different defensive settings,
providing a metric to assess and compare the efficiency of these different defensive settings.
The formalism has a sound mathematical formalization: a time to compromise (TTC) metric is
modeled for each edge as a random process combining three sub-processes. Each of these processes
has a different probability distribution (mixing exponential, gamma and beta-like distributions).
The value for the process model parameters are based on the known vulnerabilities of the consid-
ered component and the estimated skill of the attacker. A complete description and justification
of such a stochastic modeling is provided by the same authors in a previous paper [166]. In com-
promise graphs, five types of stages, corresponding to the vertices of the graph, are modeled:
recognition, breaching the perimeter, penetration, escalation of privilege, damage.
Compromise graphs are used to evaluate the efficiency of security measures, such as system
hardening, firewalls or enhanced authentication. This is achieved by comparing the shortest paths
(in terms of TTC) of compromise graphs with and without such measures in place.
The approach is illustrated in [167] by modeling attacks on a SCADA system.
Byres and Leversage adopt a very similar approach in [143, 144], called state-time estimation
algorithm (STEA), directly inspired by McQueen et al. They combine a slightly modified TTC
calculation approach with a decomposition of the attack according to the architectural areas of
the targeted system.
3.2.6 Enhanced Attack Trees
Enhanced attack trees have been introduced by Çamtepe and Yener to to support an intrusion
detection engine by modeling complex attacks with time dependencies. This model was first de-
scribed in a technical report [45] in 2006. One year later, an official conference proceedings [46]
appeared.
In addition to classical OR and AND gates, enhanced attack trees rely on the use of a new
gate, the “ordered-AND”, which allows to capture sequential behavior and constraints on the
order of attack steps. The model of enhanced attack trees has sound mathematical foundations.
Additionally to the formalism description, [46] devises a new technique for detection of attacks.
The new technique is based on automata theory and it allows to verify completeness of enhanced
attack tree models with respect to the observed attacks.
4The authors do not state whether these directed graphs are acyclic or not, but the description of compromise
graphs and their examples led us to consider compromise graphs as DAGs.
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The quantification capabilities described in [46] are directly related to intrusion detection
(probability of a given attack occurring based on a set of observed events). A confidence attribute
measured in percent is defined for subgoals as “the chance of reaching the final goal of the attacker
when a subgoal is accomplished”. It is computed as the ratio of all accomplished events until a
subgoal is realized, over all events of the modeled scenario. This attribute aims at supporting
an early warning system, supporting decision-making and reaction before actual damages occur.
Moreover, [46] introduces an original parameter called “time to live” which allows to express that
some steps are only available in a given time window.
In [175], Mishra et al. also make use of ordered-AND operators, referring to [46]. The au-
thors visually describe Stuxnet and similar attacks, but do not use Çamtepe and Yener’s rigorous
formalization to analyze the models.
3.2.7 Vulnerability Cause Graphs
Vulnerability cause graphs were invented in 2006 by Ardi, Byers and Shahmehri as a key element
of a methodology that supports security activities throughout the entire software development
lifecycle [15].
The formalism can be seen as a root cause analysis for security-related software failures, be-
cause it relates vulnerabilities with their causes. In a vulnerability cause graph, every node except
for one, has an outgoing directed edge. The single node without a successor is called the exit node
and represents the considered vulnerability. All other nodes represent causes. The predecessor-
successor (parent-child) relationship shows how certain conditions (nodes) might cause other con-
ditions (nodes) to be a concern. In an improved version of vulnerability cause graphs [39], nodes
can be simple, compound or conjunctions. Simple nodes represent conditions that may lead to a
vulnerability. Compound nodes facilitate reuse, maintenance and readability of the models. Con-
junctions represent groups of two or more other nodes. Contrary, disjunctions occur if a node has
two or more predecessors. In this case, the original nodes might have to be considered if either of
its predecessors might have to be considered. Finally, if the causes have to follow a certain order,
they are modeled as sequences of nodes. To construct a vulnerability cause graph, the exit node
is considered as a starting point and refined with causes.
In vulnerability cause graphs, nodes can be annotated as “blocked” if the underlying causes are
mitigated. The “blocked” flag allows the user to compute whether the underlying vulnerability (exit
node) is also mitigated. Vulnerability cause graphs are also equipped with a notion of graph trans-
formations that do not change whether the vulnerability is mitigated or not. The transformations
include conversions of conjunctions, reordering of sequences, combination of nodes, conversion to
compound nodes as well as derived transformations.
In [39] the vulnerability CVE-2003-0161, in [40] the vulnerability CVE-2005-2558, and in [154]
the vulnerability CVE-2005-3192 is analyzed with the help of VCGs. Furthermore, [47] contains
an additional three case studies on common software vulnerabilities which have been performed
using VCGs. The SHIELDS project [241] has developed a software tool GOAT [240] to be used in
conjunction with vulnerability cause graphs.
Vulnerability cause graphs were developed as part of a comprehensive methodology to reduce
software vulnerabilities that arise in ad hoc software development. They are the starting point
to build security activity graphs (Section 3.3.4). By introducing compound nodes, the inventors
of the formalism have created a model that allows different layers of abstraction, which in turn
introduced a problematic design decision of how many layers of abstraction are needed.
3.2.8 Dynamic Fault Trees
In 2009, Khand [124] adapted several dynamic fault tree [69, 70] gates to attack trees, in order to
add a dynamic dimension to classical attack trees. The aim of the formalism are similar to those
of attack trees (Section 3.1.1).
Dynamic fault trees [69, 70] were invented by Dugan et al. in the early 1990s to overcome
limitations of static fault trees. They aim at combining the dynamic capacities of Markovian
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models with the “look and feel” of fault trees. To achieve this, four dynamic gates are used: the
“priority-AND” (PAND), the “sequence gate” (SEQ), the “functional dependency gate” (FDEP) and
the “cold spare gates” (CSP). Khand reuses directly the three first gates (although renaming FDEP
gates by CSUB, for Conditional Subordination, gates), leaving out the CSP gates. The PAND gate
reaches a success state if all of its input are realized in a pre-assigned order (from left to right in
the graphical notation). The SEQ gate allows to model a dependency between events, such that
these events can only be realized in a particular order (from left to right in the graphical notation).
Once all the input events are realized, the gate is verified. The CSUB gate models the need of
the realization of a trigger event to allow a possible realization of others events. Dynamic fault
tree combines dynamic gates with classical logical gates (AND, OR). Dynamic gates are formally
defined with truth tables in [124], and by Markov processes in the general definitions of dynamic
fault trees from the safety literature [69, 70] (although the description is still incomplete [26]).
There is no quantification aspects developed in [124].
The paper by Khand does not specify which tool to use in order to treat the models, but several
tools exist for dynamic fault trees in the reliability area, e.g., Galileo [71].
In safety studies, quantifications associated with dynamic fault trees are usually made using
Markovian analysis techniques; those might be used here also although nothing is said about
computation aspects.
3.2.9 Serial Model for Multi-Parameter Attack Trees
In 2010, the parallel model for multi-parameter attack trees (Section 3.1.5) has been extended by
adding a temporal order on the set of elementary attacks [289]. This new methodology is called
serial model for multi-parameter attack trees and was studied further in [116,186] and [33].
The model described in [116] and [186] assumes that an adversary performs the attacks in a
given prescribed order. In [33], the authors introduce so called fully-adaptive adversary model,
where an attacker is allowed to try atomic attacks in an arbitrary order which is not fixed in
advance and can be modified based on the results of the previous trials. In both cases, the serial
approach allows for a more accurate modeling of an attacker’s behavior than the parallel approach.
In particular, the attacker can skip superfluous elementary attacks and base his decisions on success
or failure of the previously executed elementary attacks.
In [289], an efficient algorithm for computing an attacker’s expected outcome assuming a given
order of elementary attacks is provided. Taking temporal dependencies into account allows the
attacker to achieve better expected outcome than when the parallel model (Section 3.1.5) is used.
As remarked in [119], finding the best permutation of the elementary attacks in the serial model
for multi-parameter attack trees may turn computing the optimal expected outcome into a super-
exponential problem. In [186], Niitsoo proposed a decision-theoretical framework which makes
possible to compute the maximal expected outcome of a goal oriented attacker in linear time.
In [33], Buldas and Stepanenko propose a game theoretical framework to compute upper bounds
of the utility of fully-adaptive adversaries.
A prototype computer tool supporting the security analysis using the serial model of multi-
parameter attack trees has been implemented [12] and described in [13].
A thorough comparison of the parallel and the serial model for multi-parameter attack trees
has been given in the Ph.D. thesis of Jürgenson [116]. Baca and Petersen mention that in order to
use parametrized attack trees, the user needs to have a good understanding of the motivations of
the attacker [18]. To overcome this difficulty cumulative voting is used in countermeasure graphs
(Section 3.3.7).
3.2.10 Improved Attack Trees
Improved attack trees are aim at dealing with security risks that arise in space-based information
systems. They were proposed by Wen-ping and Wei-min in 2011 [287] to more precisely describe
attack on the information transmitting links, acquisitions systems and ground-based supporting
and application systems.
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The formalism is based on attack trees and explicitly incorporates the use of the sequential AND
operator. It is not defined in a formal way. Improved attack trees rely heavily on the description
by Schneier and only detail how to specifically compute the system risk.
Improved attack trees provide a specific formula to evaluate a risk value for each leaf node.
Starting from these risk values, the risk rate and the risk possibility are computed and multiplied
to compute the overall system risk. The formulas distinguish between OR, AND and sequential
AND nodes.
3.3 Static Modeling of Attacks and Defenses
3.3.1 Anti-Models
Anti-models [268] have been introduced by Lamsweerde et al. in 2003. They are closely related to
AND-OR goal-refinement structures [269] (sometimes called goal models) used for goal analysis in
requirements engineering. Anti-models extend such AND-OR goal-refinement structures with the
possibility to model malicious and intentional obstacles to security goals, called anti-goals. They
can be used to generate subtle attacks, discard non-realizable or unlikely ones, and derive more
effective customized resolutions.
In [268] and later in an extended version [267], van Lamsweerde et al. provide a six steps pro-
cedure for a systematic construction of anti-models. First, anti-goals, representing an attacker’s
goals, are obtained by negating confidentiality, privacy, integrity, availability, authentication or
non-repudiation requirements. For each anti-goal, the questions “who” and “why” are asked to
identify potential classes of attackers and their higher-level anti-goals. An AND-OR refinement
process is then applied to reach terminal anti-goals that are realizable by the attackers. The result-
ing AND-OR anti-models relate “attackers, their anti-goals, referenced objects and anti-operations
(necessary to achieve their anti-goals) to the attackees, their goals, objects, operations and vulner-
abilities.” The construction of anti-models is only informally presented in [268]. Formal techniques
developed for AND-OR goal-refinement structures (such as refinement obstacle trees) [269] can
be used for the generation and analysis of anti-models. In particular, real-time temporal logic can
be employed to model anti-goals as sets of attack scenarios. After identifying possible anti-goals,
countermeasures expressed as epistemic extensions of real-time temporal logic operators are se-
lected based on severity or likelihood of the corresponding threat and non-functional system goals
that have been identified earlier. Possible resolutions tactics, inspired by solutions proposed for
analysis of non-functional requirements in software engineering, are described in [269] and [267].
Applying resolution operators yields new security goals to be integrated in the model. These new
goals are then again refined with the help of AND-OR structures. These, in turn, may require a
new round of anti-model construction and analysis.
The anti-models do not include quantitative analysis of security goals or anti-goals.
3.3.2 Defense Trees
Defense trees5 are attack trees where leaf nodes are decorated with a set of countermeasures.
They have been introduced by Bistarelli et al. in 2006 [22]. The approach combines qualitative
and quantitative aspects and serves general security modeling purposes.
The approach proposed by Bistarelli et al. was a first step towards integrating a defender’s
behavior into models based on attack trees. The analysis methodology for defense trees proposed
in [22] and [21] uses rigorous and formal techniques, such as calculation of economic indexes and
game theoretical solution concepts. However, the model itself is only introduced verbally and a
formal definition is not given.
In [22], the return on attack (ROA) and return on investment (ROI) indexes are used for quan-
titative analysis of defense trees from the point of view of an attacker and a defender, respectively.
The calculation of ROI and ROA is based on the following parameters: costs, impact, number of
occurrences of a threat and gain. The indexes provide a useful method to evaluate IT security
5Papers by Bistarelli et al. use British English, thus originally, the name of their formalism is defence trees.
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investments and to support the risk management process. In [21], game theoretical reasoning was
introduced to analyze attack–defense scenarios modeled with the help of defense trees. In this
paper, a defense tree represents a game between two players: an attacker and a defender. The ROI
and ROA indexes, are used as utility functions and allow to evaluate the effectiveness and the
profitability of countermeasures. The authors of [21] propose using Nash equilibria to select the
best strategy for the players.
In [23], defense trees have been extended to so called CP-defense trees, where modeling of
preferences between countermeasures and actions is possible. Transforming CP-defense trees into
answer set optimization (ASO) programs, allows to select the most suitable set of countermeasures,
by computing the optimal answer set of the corresponding ASO program. Formalisms such as
attack–defense trees (Section 3.3.6), and attack countermeasure trees (Section 3.3.5) extended
defense trees by allowing defensive actions to be placed at any node of the tree and not only at
the leaf nodes.
3.3.3 Protection Trees
Protection trees are a tree-based formalism which allow a user to allocate limited resources towards
the appropriate defenses against specified attacks. The methodology was invented by Edge et al.
in 2006, in order to incorporate defenses in the attack tree methodology [74].
Protection tree are similar to attack trees since both decompose high level goals into smaller
manageable pieces by means of an AND-OR tree structure. The difference is that in protection
tree the nodes represent protections. A protection tree is generated from an already established
attack tree by finding a protection against every leaf node of the attack tree. Then the attack tree
is traversed in a bottom-up way and new protection nodes are added to the protection tree if the
protection nodes do not already cover the parent attack node.
The AND-OR structure of protection trees is enriched with three metrics, namely probability
of success, financial costs and performance costs on which the standard bottom-up approach is
applied [73–75]. In [56], an additional metrics, the impact, helps to further prioritize where budget
should be spent.
The formalism has been investigated in case studies on how the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security can allocate resources to protect their computer networks [74], how an attack on an online
banking system can be mitigated cost-efficiently [75], how to cheaply protect against an attack
on computer and RFID networks [56] as well as a mobile ad hoc network [73]. When evaluating
which defenses to install, the authors propose to first prune the tree according to the attacker’s
assumed capabilities. A larger, more applied case study to “evaluate the effectiveness of attack and
protection trees in documenting the threats and vulnerabilities present in a generic Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) architecture” was performed by Cowan et al. [51].
In [75] a slightly different algorithm for creation of a protection tree was proposed. Here a
designer starts by finding defenses against the root of an attack tree instead of the leaves, as
in [73, 74]. An approach similar to protection trees has been proposed in [228] to deal with the
problem of threat modeling in software development. The paper uses so called identification trees
to identify threats in software design and introduces the model of mitigation trees to describe
countermeasures for identified threats. Despite an obvious modeling analogy between protection
trees and mitigation trees, no connection between the two models has been made explicit in the
literature.
3.3.4 Security Activity Graphs
In 2006, Ardi, Byers and Shahmehri introduced a formalism called security activity graphs (SAGs).
The methodology was invented in order to “improve security throughout the software development
process” [15]. SAGs depict possible vulnerability cause mitigations and are algorithmically gener-
ated from vulnerability cause graphs (Section 3.2.7).
SAGs are a graphical representation of first order predicate calculus and are based very loosely
on ideas from fault tree analysis. In [15] the root of a SAG is associated with a vulnerability,
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taken from a vulnerability cause graph. The vulnerability mitigations are modeled with the help
of activities (leaf nodes). The syntax furthermore consists of AND-gates, OR-gates and split gates.
The AND and OR-gates strictly follow Boolean logic, whereas the split gate allows one activity to
be used in several parent activities, essentially creating a DAGs structure. The syntax of SAGs was
changed in [41] for a more concise illustration of the models. Split gates no longer appear in the
formalism. The functionality that simple activities can be distinguished from compound activities
(complex activities that may require further breakdown) was added. Moreover cause references
(possible attack points) serve as placeholders for a different SAG associated with a particular
cause.
In the SAG model, Boolean variables attached to the leaves of the SAG. A Boolean variable
corresponding to an activity is true when it “is implemented perfectly during software development”
otherwise, it is false. Then a value corresponding to the root of the SAG is deduced in a bottom-up
fashion according to Boolean logic.
Visual representation of SAGs is supported by SeaMonster [173] and GOAT [240]. Furthermore,
SAGs have been used in [40, 41] to model the vulnerability CVE-2005-2558 in MySQL that leads
to “denial of service or arbitrary code execution”.
Even though the model was devised in order to aid the software development cycle, the au-
thors explicitly state that SAGs “lend themselves to other applications such as process analysis.”
SAGs are the middle step of a broader 3-steps approach for secure software development, with
vulnerability cause graphs as a first step, and process component definition as a final step. In 2010
SAGs were replaced by security goal models (Section 3.4.7)
3.3.5 Attack Countermeasure Trees
In 2010, Roy, Kim and Trivedi proposed attack countermeasure trees (ACT) [224,225] as a method-
ology for attack and defense modeling which unifies analysis methods proposed for attack trees
(Section 3.1.1) with those introduced on defense trees (Section 3.3.2). The main difference of ACTs
with respect to defense trees is that in ACTs defensive measures can be placed at any node of the
tree. Also, the quantitative analysis proposed for defense trees is extended by incorporating prob-
abilistic analysis into the model. ACTs were first introduced in [225] and then further developed
in [226].
ACTs may involve three distinct classes of events: attack events, detection events and mitigation
events. The set of classical AND and OR nodes, as defined for attack trees, is extended with the
possibility of using k-out-of-n nodes. Generation and analysis of attack countermeasure scenarios is
automated using minimal cut sets (mincuts). Mincuts help to determine possible ways of attacking
and defending a system and to identify the system’s most critical components.
A rigorous mathematical framework is provided for quantitative analysis of ACTs in [225]
and [226]. The evaluation of the ROI and ROA attributes, as proposed for defense trees (Sec-
tion 3.3.2), has been extended by adding the probability of attack, detection and mitigation events.
The authors of [226] provide algorithms for probability computation on trees with an without re-
peated nodes. With the help of probability parameters, further metrics, including cost, impact,
Birnbaum’s importance measure and risk, are evaluated. The use of the Birnbaum’s importance
measure (also called reliability importance measure, in the case of fault trees) is used to prioritize
defense mechanisms countering attack events. Furthermore, in [226], Roy et al. propose a cubic
algorithm to select an optimal set of countermeasures for an ACT. This addresses the problem
of state-space explosion that the intrusion response and recovery engine based on attack-response
trees (Section 3.4.5) suffers from. Finally, in [227] the problem of selecting an optimal set of
countermeasures with and without having probability assignments has been discussed.
The authors of [226] implemented a module for automatic description and evaluation of ACTs
in a modeling tool called Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evalu-
ator [264]. This implementation uses already existing algorithms for analysis of fault trees and
extends them with algorithms to compute costs, impact and risk. Case studies concerning attacks
on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), SCADA systems and malicious insider attacks have been
performed using ACTs, as described in the Master thesis of Roy [223].
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The model of attack countermeasure trees is very similar to attack–defense trees. The main
differences between the two models are listed in Section 3.3.6.
3.3.6 Attack–Defense Trees
Attack–defense trees (ADTrees) were proposed by Kordy et al. in 2010 [132]. They allow to illus-
trate security scenarios that involve two opposing players: an attacker and a defender. Consequently
it is possible to model interleaving attacker and defender actions qualitatively and quantitatively.
ADTrees can be seen as merging attack trees (Section 3.1.1) and protection trees (Section 3.3.3)
into one formalism.
In ADTrees, both types of nodes, attacks and defenses, can be conjunctively as well as disjunc-
tively refined. Furthermore, the formalism allows for each node to have one child of the opposite
type. Children of opposite type represent countermeasures. These countermeasures can be refined
and countered again. Two sets of formal definitions build the basis of ADTrees: a graph-based
definition and an equivalent term-based definition. The graph-based definition ensures a visual
and intuitive handling of ADTrees models. The term-based representation allows for formal rea-
soning about the models. The formalism is enriched through several semantics that allow to define
equivalent ADTree representations of a scenario [133]. The necessity for multiple semantics is mo-
tivated by diverse applications of ADTrees, in particular unification of other attack tree related
approaches and suitability for various kinds of computations. In [135], the authors showed that, for
a wide class of semantics (i.e., every semantics induced by a De Morgan lattice), ADTrees extend
the modeling capabilities of attack trees without increasing the computational complexity of the
model. In [133] the most often used semantics for ADTrees have been characterized by finite axiom
schemes, which provides an operational method for defining equivalent ADTree representations.
The authors of [131], have established a connection between game theory and graphical security
assessment using ADTrees. More precisely, ADTrees under a semantics derived from propositional
logics are shown to be equally expressive as two-player binary zero-sum extensive form games.
The standard bottom-up algorithm, formalized for attack trees in [161], has been extended
to ADTrees in [133]. This required the introduction of four new operators (two for conjunction
and disjunction of defense nodes and two for countermeasure links) [133]. Together with the two
standard operators (for conjunctions and disjunctions of attack nodes) and a set of values, the
six operators form an attribute domain. Specifying attribute domains allows the user to quantify
a variety of security relevant parameters, such as time of attack, probability of defense, scenario
satisfiability and environmental costs. The authors of [133] show that every attribute for which
the attribute domain is based on a semi-ring can be evaluated on ADTrees using the bottom-up
algorithm. How to properly specify attribute domains in terms of questions in natural language
was presented in [134].
An extensive case study on a real-life RFID goods management system was performed by
academic and industrial researchers with different backgrounds [19]. The case study resulted in
specific guidelines about the use of attributes on ADTrees. A software tool, called the ADTool [136],
supporting the attack-defense tree methodology, has been developed as one of the outcomes of
the ATREES project [17]. The main features of the tool are easy creation, efficient editing, and
quantitative analysis of ADTrees [130]. Since from a formal perspective, attack trees (Section 3.1.1),
protection trees (Section 3.3.3), and defense trees (Section 3.3.2) are instances of attack–defense
trees, the ADTool also supports all these formalisms.
Finally, ADTrees can be seen as natural extension of defense trees (Section 3.3.2) where defenses
are only allowed as leaf nodes. The ADTree formalism is quite similar to attack countermeasure
trees (Section 3.3.5), however, there exist a couple of fundamental differences between the two
models. On the one hand, in ADTrees defense nodes can be refined and countered, which is
not possible in attack countermeasure trees. On the other hand, attack countermeasure trees
distinguish between detection and mitigation events which are both modeled with defense nodes
in ADTrees. Another difference is that attack countermeasure trees are well suited to compute
specific parameters, including probability, return on investment (ROI) and return on attack (ROA).
ADTrees, in turn, focus on general methods for attribute computation. A different formalism, also
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called attack–defense trees, was used by Du et al. in [68] to perform a game-theoretic analysis
of Vehicular ad-hoc network security by utilizing the ROA and ROI utility functions. Despite
sharing the same name with the formalism introduced in [132], the attack–defense tree approach
used in [68] is built up on defense trees (Section 3.3.2) and does not contain the possibility to
refine countermeasures. Moreover it does not consider any formal semantics.
3.3.7 Countermeasure Graphs
Countermeasure graphs provide a DAG-based structure for identification and prioritization of
countermeasures. They were introduced by Baca and Petersen [18] in 2010 as an integral part
of the “countermeasure method for security” which aims at simplifying countermeasure selection
through cumulative voting.
To build the graphical model, actors, goals, attacks and countermeasures are identified. Goals
explain why someone attacks a system, actors are the ones that attack the system, goal explain
why actors attack a system, attacks detail how the system could get attacked and countermeasures
describe how attacks could be prevented. When the representing events are related, edges are drawn
between goals and actors, actors and attack as well as between attacks and countermeasures. More
specifically, an edge is drawn between a goal and an actor if the actor pursues the goal. An edge
is inserted between an actor and an attack, if the actor is likely to be able to execute the attack.
Finally an edge is drawn between an attack and a countermeasure if the countermeasure is able to
prevent the attack. Priorities are assigned to goals, actors, attacks and countermeasures according
to the rules of hierarchical cumulative voting [20]. The higher the assigned priority is, the higher
the threat level of the corresponding event is.
With the help of hierarchical cumulative voting [20] the most effective countermeasures can be
deduced. Clever normalization and the fact that countermeasures that prevent several attacks con-
tribute more to the final result than isolated countermeasures guarantee that the countermeasure
with the highest computed value is most efficient and should therefore be implemented.
The methodology is demonstrated on an open source system, a first person shooter called
Code 43 [18].
3.4 Sequential Modeling of Attacks and Defenses
3.4.1 Insecurity Flows
In 1997, Moskowitz and Kang described a model called insecurity flows to support risk assess-
ment [182]. It combines graph theory and discrete probability, offering both graphical represen-
tation and quantification capabilities to analyze how an “invader can penetrate through security
holes to various protective security domains”. This analysis aims at identifying the most vulnerable
paths and the most appropriate security measures to eliminate them.
From a high level perspective, insecurity flows are similar to reliability block diagrams [106]
used in reliability engineering, without however mentioning such a similarity [182]. The source
corresponds to the starting point of the attacker, the sink corresponds to the objective of the
attacker, and the asset under protection. An insecurity flow diagram is a circuit connecting security
measures, as serial or in parallel, from the sink to the source. Serial nodes must be passed one
after the other by the attacker, whereas only one out of n connected in parallel must be passed
to continue its path to the sink. The graph is used to identify insecurity flows and quantify them
using probabilistic calculations. The paper provides a sound description of the formalism and the
associated quantifications.
Based on the circuit, the probability that the insecurity flow can pass through the modeled
security measures of a given system or architecture can be computed. Probability computation
formulas for simple serial and parallel patterns are provided, whereas reduction formulas are pro-
posed for more elaborated circuits (decomposing them into the simple patterns). Several defensive
architectures can be compared along this metrics.
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3.4.2 Intrusion DAGs
Intrusion DAGs (I-DAGs) have been introduced by Wu et al. [292] as the underlying structure for
attack goals representation in the Adaptive Intrusion Tolerant System, called ADEPTS in 2003.
The global goal of ADEPTS is to localize and automatically respond to detected, possibly multiple
and concurrent intrusions on a distributed system.
I-DAGs are directed acyclic graphs representing intrusion goals in ADEPTS. I-DAGs are not
necessarily rooted DAGs, i.e., they may have multiple roots. The nodes of an I-DAG represent
(sub-)goals of an attack and can be associated with an alert from the intrusion detection framework
described in [293]. A goal represented by a node can only be achieved if (some of) the goals of its
children are achieved. To model the connection, I-DAGs use standard AND and OR refinement
features similar to the refinements in attack trees. Each node stores two information sets: a cause
service set (including all services that may be compromised in order to achieve the goal) and an
effect service set (including all services that are taken to be compromised once the goal is achieved).
The method presented in [292] allows to automatically trigger a response of appropriate severity,
based on a value which expresses the confidence that the goal corresponding to a node has been
achieved. This provides dynamic aspects to the ADEPTS methodology.
Three algorithms have been developed in order to support automated responses to detected
incidents. The goal of the first algorithm is to classify all nodes as candidates for responses as
follows. A bottom-up procedure assigns the compromised confidence index to each node situated
on the paths between the node representing a detected incident and a root node. Then, a value
called threshold is defined by the user and is used by a top down procedure to label the nodes as
strong, weak, very weak or non-candidates for potential responses. The second algorithm assigns
the response index to nodes. The response index is a real number used to determine the response
to be taken for a given node in the I-DAG. Finally, the third algorithm is based on so called
effectiveness index. It is responsible for dynamically deciding which responses are to be taken
next. Intuitively, the effectiveness index of a node is reduced for every detected failure of a response
action and increased for every successful deployment.
A lightweight distributed e-commerce system has been deployed to serve as a test bed for the
ADEPTS tool. The system contained 6 servers and has 26 nodes in the corresponding I-DAG. The
results of the experiments and analysis are described in [292].
In [86] and [291], the authors extend the model of intrusion DAGs to intrusion graphs (I-
GRAPHs). The main difference is that, contrary to I-DAGs, I-GRAPHs may contain cycles. Nodes
of an I-GRAPH do not need to be independent. All dependencies between the nodes are depicted
by the edges between nodes. Additionally to AND and OR refinements, I-GRAPHs also make
use of quorum edges. A value called minimum required quorum is assigned to quorum edges and
represents the minimal number of children that need to be achieved in order to achieve the parent
node.
3.4.3 Bayesian Defense Graphs
In a series of papers starting in 2008, Sommestad et al. construct a Bayesian network for security
(Section 3.2.3) that includes defenses to perform enterprise architecture analysis [76,89,249–251].
Their model, explicitly called Bayesian defense graphsin [250], is guided by the idea to depict what
exists in a system rather than what it is used for [250]. This philosophy was adapted from [113].
Bayesian defense graphs are inspired by defense trees (Section 3.3.2) and therefore add countermea-
sures to Bayesian networks. As a result, the formalism supports a holistic system view including
attack and defense components.
Bayesian defense graphs are built up on extended influence diagrams (Section 5.4), including
utility nodes, decisions nodes chance nodes and arcs. Chance nodes and decision nodes are asso-
ciated with random variables that may assume one of several predefined and mutually exclusive
sates. The random variables are given as conditional probability tables (or matrices). Utility nodes
express the combination of states in chance nodes and decision nodes. Countermeasures, which are
controllable elements from the perspective of the system owner, are represented as chance nodes
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with adapted conditional probability tables. Finally, causal arcs (including an AND or OR label)
are drawn between the nodes indicating how the conditional probabilities are related. A strength
of Bayesian defense graphs is that they allow to trade-off between collecting as much data as
possible and the degree of accuracy of the collected data. Through the use of iterative refinement,
it is possible to reduce the complexity of the model [250].
Like all formalisms that involve Bayesian statistics, Bayesian defense graphs use conditional
probability tables to answer “how do the security mechanisms influence each other?” and “How
do they contribute to enterprise-wide security?” [249]. The authors of [249] exemplify how to
compute the expected loss for both the current scenario and potential future scenarios. In [89],
a suitable subset of a set of 82 security metrics known as Joint Quarterly Readiness Review
(JQRR) metrics has been selected and adapted to Bayesian Defense graphs. The metrics serve as
“a posteriori indicators on the historical success rates of hostile attacks” or “indicate the current
state of countermeasures”. The formalism can handle causal and uncertainty measurements at the
same time, by specifying how to combine the conditional probability tables.
With the help of a software tool for abstract models [113], Bayesian defense graphs were applied
by Sommestad et al. to analyze enterprise architectures on numerous occasions.In [76] ongoing
efforts on Bayesian defense graphs within the EU research project VIKING [272] are summarized.
The methodology is expanded in three follow-up papers that illustrate security assessment based
on an enterprise architecture model [249,250] and information flow during a spoofing attack on a
server [89]. In [251], a real case study was performed with a power distribution operator to assess
the security of wide-area networks (WANs) used to operate electrical power systems. Since the
results could not be published the methodology was demonstrated on a fictitious example assessing
the security of two communication links with the help of conditional probability tables [251].
A similar but less developed idea of using random variables, defenses and an inference algorithm
to compute the expected cost of an attack is presented by Mirembe and Muyeba [174].
3.4.4 Security Goal Indicator Trees
Peine, Jawurek and Mandel devised security goal indicator trees in 2008, in order to support
security inspections of software development and documents [203].
A security goal indicator tree is a tree which combines negative and positive security features
that can be checked during an inspection, in order to see if a security goal (e.g., secure password
management) is met. With this objective in mind, “indicators” can be linked in the resulting tree
structure by three types of relations: Conditional dependencies are represented by a special kind
of edge, Boolean combination are modeled by OR and AND gates, a “specialization” relation is
represented by a UML-like inheritance symbol. Moreover, a notion of “polarity” is defined for
each node, attributing positive or negative effect of a given property on security. The definition of
security goal indicator trees is semi-formal.
The formalism does not support quantitative evaluations.
Security goal indicator trees are implemented in a prototype tool, mentioned in [203]. They are
used to formalize security inspection processes for a distributed repository of digital cultural data
in e-tourism application in [115]. The formalism is extended to dependability inspection in [128].
3.4.5 Attack-Response Trees
In 2009, Zonouz, Khurana, Sanders, and Yardley introduced attack-response trees (ART) as a part
of a methodology called response and recovery engine (RRE), which was proposed to automate
the intrusion response process. The goal of the RRE is to provide an instantaneous response
to intrusions and thus eliminate the delay which occurs when the response process is performed
manually. The approach is modeled as a two-player Stackelberg stochastic game between the leader
(RRE) and the follower (attacker). Attack-response trees have been used in [300], for the first time.
This paper constitutes a part of the Ph.D. thesis of Zonouz [299].
ARTs are an extension of attack trees (Section 3.1.1) that incorporate possible response actions
against attacks. They provide a formal way to describe the system security based on possible intru-
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sion and response scenarios for the attacker and the response engine, respectively. An important
difference between attack trees and attack-response trees is that the former represent all possible
ways of achieving an attack goal and the latter are built based on the attack consequences6. In an
attack-response tree, a violation of a security property, e.g., integrity, confidentiality or availability,
is assigned to the root node (main consequence). Refining nodes represent sub-consequences whose
occurrence implies that the parent consequence will take place. Some consequence nodes are then
tagged by response nodes that represent response actions against the consequence to which they
are connected.
The goal of attack-response trees is to probabilistically verify whether the security property
specified by the root of an attack-response tree has been violated, given the sequence of the received
alerts and the successfully taken response actions. First, a simple bottom-up procedure is applied
in the case when values 0 and 1 are assigned to the leaf nodes. More precisely, when a response
assigned to a node v is activated (i.e., is assigned with 1), the values in the subtree rooted in v are
reset to 0. Second, [300] also discusses the situation when uncertainties in intrusion detections and
alert notifications render the determination of Boolean values impossible. In this case, satisfaction
probabilities are assigned to the nodes of attack-response trees and a game-theoretic algorithm is
used to decide on the optimal response action. In [301], the RRE has been extended to incorporate
both IT system-level and business-level metrics to the model. Here, the combined metrics are used
to recommend optimal response actions to security attacks.
The RRE has been implemented on top of the intrusion detection system (IDS) Snort 2.7,
as described in [299]. A validation of the approach on a SCADA system use case [300] and a
web-based retail company example [301] has shown that this dynamic method performs better
than static response mechanisms based on lookup tables. The RRE allows to recover the system
with lower costs and is more helpful than static engines when a large number of IDS alerts from
different parts of the system are received.
As pointed out in [225], the approach described in this section suffers from the state space
explosion problem. To overcome this problem, attack countermeasure trees (Section 3.3.5) have
been introduced. Their authors propose efficient algorithms for selecting an optimal set of coun-
termeasures.
3.4.6 Boolean Logic Driven Markov Process
Boolean logic driven Markov processes (BDMPs) are a general security modeling formalism, which
can also complete generic risk assessment procedures. It was invented by Bouissou and Bon in 2003
in the safety and reliability area [27], and was adapted to security modeling by Piètre-Cambacédès
and Bouissou in 2010 [208,209] 7. Its goal is to find a better trade-off between readability, modeling
power and quantification capabilities with respect to the existing formalisms in general and attack
trees in particular.
BDMPs combine the readability of classical attack trees with the modeling power of Markov
chains. They change the attack tree semantics by augmenting it with links called triggers. In
a first approach, triggers allow modeling of sequences and simple dependencies by conditionally
“activating” sub-trees of the global structure. The root (top event) of an BDMP is the objective
of the attacker. The leaves correspond to attack steps or security events. They are associated to
Markov processes, dynamically selected in function of the states of some other leaves. They can
be connected by a wide choice of logical gates, including AND, OR, and PAND gates, commonly
used in dynamic fault trees (Section 3.2.8). The overall approach allows for sequential modeling in
an attack tree-like structure, while enabling efficient quantifications. BDMPs for security are well
formalized [208].
Success or realization parameters (mean time to success or to realization) are associated to
the leaves, depending on the basic event modeled. Defense-centric attributes can also be added,
reflecting detection and reaction capabilities (the corresponding parameters are the probability
6A reader may notice that what the authors of [300] call “sub-consequences” are in fact the causes of the main
consequence.
7The original idea was introduced in a fast abstract by the same authors in 2009 [207]
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or the mean-time to detection for a given leaf, and the reduction of chance of success in case of
detection). BDMPs for security allow for different types of quantification. These quantifications
include the computation of time-domain metrics (overall mean-time to success, probability of
success in a given time, ordered list of attack sequences leading to the objectives), attack tree
related metrics like costs of attacks, handling of Boolean indicators (e.g., specific requirements),
and risk analysis oriented tools like sensibility graphs by attack step or event [211], etc.
The model construction and its analysis are supported by an industrial tool, called KB3 [72].
In [211], implementation issues and user feedback are discussed and analyzed. BDMPs are used
in [112,210] to integrate safety and security analyses while [138] develops a realistic use-case based
on the Stuxnet attack.
In several papers [208,209,211], the authors point out the intrinsic limits of BDMPs to model
cyclic behaviors and loops, as well as the difficulties to assign relevant values for the leaves.
3.4.7 Security Goal Models
In 2010, Security goal models (SGMs) were formalized by Byers and Shahmehri [42] in oder to
identify the causes of software vulnerabilities and model their dependencies. They were introduced
as a more expressive replacement for attack trees (Section 3.1.1), security goal indicator trees (Sec-
tion 3.4.4), vulnerability cause graphs (Section 3.2.7), and security activity graphs (Section 3.3.4).
The root goal of a SGM corresponds to a vulnerability. “Starting with the root, subgoals are
incrementally identified until a complete model has been created” [237].
In SGMs, a goal can be anything that affects security or some other goal, e.g., it can be
a vulnerability, a security functionality, a security-related software development activity or an
attack. SGMs have two types of goal refinements: one type represents dependencies and one type
modeling information flow. Dependency nodes are connected with solid edges (dependence edge)
and are depicted by white nodes for contributing subgoals and by black nodes for countering
subgoals. Information edges are displayed with dashed edges. The formalism consists of a syntactic
domain (elements that make up the model), an abstract syntax (how elements can be combined),
a visual representation (used graphical symbols) and a semantic transformation from the syntactic
domain to the semantic domain. The syntactic domain consists of the root, subgoals (contributing
or counteracting), dependency edges, operators AND and OR that express the connection of
dependency edges, annotation connected to nodes by annotation edges, stereotype (usually an
annotation about a dependency edge), ports that model information flow and information edges
that connect ports. The abstract syntax defined in a UML class diagram [237].
It is possible to evaluate whether a security goal was successfully reached or not. To do this,
each cause is defined with a logical predicate (true/false). Then the predicates are composed using
Boolean logic and taking the information from the information edges into account.
SGM were used in a case study about passive testing vulnerability detection, i.e., examining
the traces of a software system without the need for specific test inputs. In a four step testing
procedure vulnerabilities are first modeled using SGMs. In the next step, causes are formally
defined before SGMs are converted into vulnerability detection conditions (VDC). In the final
step vulnerabilities are checked based on the VDCs. In [237] this procedure is performed on the
xine media player [260] where an older version contained the CVE-2009-1274 vulnerability. The
case study is executed with the help of “TestInv-Code”, a program developed by Montimage that
can handle VCDs.
In [42], the authors explicitly state that they have defined transformations to and from attack
trees VCGs, SAGs and SGITs so that SGMs can be used with possibly familiar notation. (The
transformations, however, were omitted due to space restrictions.)
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3.4.8 Unified Parameterizable Attack Trees
In 2011, Wang, Whitley, Phan and Parish introduce unified parameterizable attack trees8 [278].
As the name suggests, the formalism was created as a foundation to unify numerous existing
extensions of attack trees (Section 3.1.1). The formalism generalizes the notions of connector types,
edge augmentations and (node) attributes. With the help of these generalizations it is possible
to describe other extensions of attack trees as structural extensions, computation extensions or
hybrid extensions.
Unified parameterizable attack trees are defined as a 5-tuple, consisting of a set of nodes, a
set of edges, a set of allowed connectors (O-AND i.e., a time or priority based AND, U-AND i.e.,
an AND with a threshold condition and OR), a set of attributes and a set of edge augmentation
structures that allows to specify edge labels. Using this definition, the authors of [278] identify
defense trees (Section 3.3.2), attack countermeasure trees (Section 3.3.5), attack-response trees
(Section 3.4.5), attack–defense trees (Section 3.3.6), protection trees (Section 3.3.3), OWA trees
(Section 3.1.4), and augmented attack trees (Section 3.1.3) as structure-based extensions of attack
tree that are covered by unified parameterizable attack trees. They classify multi-parameter attack
trees (Section 3.1.5 and 3.2.9) as a computational extension of attack trees.
The formalism classifies attributes into the categories of “attack accomplishment attributes”,
“attack evaluation attributes” and “victim system attributes”, but does not specify how to perform
quantitative evaluations.
Unified parameterizable attack trees are primarily built upon augmented attack trees (Sec-
tion 3.1.3). In fact, the authors indicate how to instantiate the node attributes, the edge augmen-
tation and the connector type to obtain an augmented attack tree.
4 Summary of the surveyed formalisms
In this section, we provide a consolidated view of all formalisms introduced in Section 3. Tables 2–
4 characterize the described methodologies (ordered alphabetically) according to the 13 aspects
presented in Table 1. The aspects are grouped into formalism features and capabilities (Table 2),
formalism characteristics (Table 3), and formalism maturity and usability factors (Table 4). This
tabular view allows the reader to compare the features of the formalisms more easily, it stresses
their similarities and differences. Furthermore, the tables support a user in selecting the most
appropriate formalism(s) with respect to specific modeling needs and requirements. We illustrate
such a support on two exemplary situations.
Example 1 Let us assume that during a risk assessment, analysts want to investigate and com-
pare the efficiency of different defensive measures and controls, with respect to several attack
scenarios. Thereto, they need quantitative elements to support the analysis technique they will
choose. Furthermore, a software tool and pre-existing use cases are required to facilitate their
work. Using the corresponding columns from Tables 2–4 (i.e., attack or defensive, quantification,
tool availability, case study) and choosing the formalisms characterized by appropriate values
(respectively: both, versatile or specific, industrial or prototype, real(istic)), would help the ana-
lysts to pre-selected attack countermeasure trees, attack–defense trees, BDMPs, intrusion DAGs,
and security activity graphs, as potential modeling and analysis techniques. The most suitable
methodology could then be selected based on more detailed information provided in Section 3. For
instance, let us assume that the analysis requires the use of measures for probability of success,
the attacker’s costs and the attacker’s skills. Checking descriptions of the pre-selected formalisms,
given in Section 3, would convince the analysts that security activity graphs and intrusion DAGs
would not allow them to compute the expected quantitative elements. Therefore it would reduce
the choice to attack countermeasure trees, attack–defense trees, and BDMPs. A more thorough
8Wang et al. use British English, thus originally, the name of their formalism is unified parametrizable attack
trees.
27
investigation of the computational procedures and algorithms described in the referred papers
would help the analysts to make the final decision on the formalism that best fits their needs.
Example 2 Now, let us assume that a team of penetration testers wants to illustrate which
attack paths they have used to compromise different systems. Initially, this does not significantly
reduce the choice of possible formalisms, since they could use all attack-oriented and all attack
and defense oriented approaches. However, to keep the model as simple as possible, they start
the selection process by looking at the attack-oriented methodologies only. Let us assume further
that the penetration testers also do not need to represent sequences of actions. With a similar
reasoning as before, they first investigate a possibility of using a static modeling technique. The
team does not foresee to perform any quantitative analysis. An important requirement, however, is
to employ a methodology which is already broadly used, with at least rudimentary documented use
cases on which they could rely to build their own models. Using relevant columns from Tables 2–4
(i.e., attack or defense, sequential or static, paper count, use cases, quantification) and selecting
formalisms characterized with appropriate values (respectively: attack or both, sequential or static,
> 4, real(istic) or toy, versatile, specific or no), the team obtains a large number of applicable
formalisms. In order to keep the formalism as simple as possible, the analysts decide to narrow
the set of values they are interested in to: attack, static, > 4, real(istic) or toy, no. This strategy
yields the following most suitable formalisms: attack trees, augmented attack trees, and parallel
model for multi-parameter attack trees. The team would then be able to make a final choice of the
methodology based on complementary investigations starting from the information and references
provided by the corresponding textual descriptions from Section 3.
Table 2: Aspects relating to the formalism’s modeling capabilities
Name of formalism
Attack or
defense
Sequential
or static
Quantifi-
cation
Main
Purpose
Extension
Anti-models
(Section 3.3.1)
Both Static No Req. eng. New formalism
Attack countermeasure
trees (Section 3.3.5)
Both Static Specific Sec. mod.
Structural
Computational
Attack–defense trees
(Section 3.3.6)
Both Static Versatile Sec. mod.
Structural
Computational
Attack-response trees
(Section 3.4.5)
Both Sequential Specific Int. det.
Structural
Quantitative
Attack trees
(Section 3.1.1)
Attack Static Versatile Sec. mod. New formalism
Augmented attack trees
(Section 3.1.3)
Attack Static Specific Sec. mod.
Structural
Computational
Augmented vulnerabil-
ity trees (Section 3.1.2)
Attack Static Specific Risk Quantitative
Bayesian attack graphs
(Section 3.2.4)
Attack Sequential Specific Risk
Structural
Computational
Bayesian defense graphs
(Section 3.4.3)
Both Sequential Specific Risk
Structural
Computational
Bayesian networks for
security (Section 3.2.3)
Attack Sequential Specific Risk
Structural
Computational
BDMPs (Section 3.4.6) Both Sequential Versatile Sec. mod.
Order
Time
Compromise graphs
(Section 3.2.5)
Attack Sequential Specific Risk New formalism
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Countermeasure graphs
(Section 3.3.7)
Both Static Specific Sec. mod.
Structural
Computational
Cryptographic DAGs
(Section 3.2.1)
Attack Sequential No Risk New formalism
Defense trees
(Section 3.3.2)
Both Static Specific Sec. mod.
Structural
Computational
Dynamic fault trees for
security (Section 3.2.8)
Attack Sequential No Sec. mod.
Order
Time
Enhanced attack trees
(Section 3.2.6)
Attack Sequential Specific Int. det.
Order
Time
Extended fault trees
(Section 3.1.6)
Attack Static Specific Unification Structural
Fault trees for security
(Section 3.2.2)
Attack Sequential No Sec. mod. Order
Improved attack trees
(Section 3.2.10)
Attack Sequential Specific Risk
Structural
Computational
Insecurity flows
(Section 3.4.1)
Both Sequential Specific Risk New formalism
Intrusion DAGs
(Section 3.4.2)
Both Sequential Specific Int. det.
Structural
Computational
OWA trees
(Section 3.1.4)
Attack Static Specific Quantitative
Structural
Computational
Parallel model for
multi-parameter attack
trees (Section 3.1.5)
Attack Static Specific Quantitative
Quantitative
Computational
Protection trees
(Section 3.3.3)
Defense Static Specific Sec. mod. New formalism
Security activity graphs
(Section 3.3.4)
Both Static Specific Soft. dev. New formalism
Security goal indicator
trees (Section 3.4.4)
Defense Sequential No Soft. dev. New formalism
Security goal models
(Section 3.4.7)
Both Sequential Specific Unification
Structural
Computational
Serial model for multi-
parameter attack trees
(Section 3.2.9)
Attack Sequential Specific Quantitative
Computational
Order
Unified parameterizable
attack trees
(Section 3.4.8)
Both Sequential Versatile Unification Structural
Vulnerability cause
graphs (Section 3.2.7)
Attack Sequential Specific Soft. dev.
Structural
Order
Table 3: Aspects relating to the formalism’s characteristics
Name of formalism Structure Connectors Formalization
Anti-models
(Section 3.3.1)
Tree AND, OR Semi-formal
Attack countermeasure
trees (Section 3.3.5)
Tree AND, OR, k-out-of-n, counter leaves Formal
Attack–defense trees
(Section 3.3.6)
Tree AND, OR, countermeasures Formal
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Attack-response trees
(Section 3.4.5)
Tree AND, OR, responses Formal
Attack trees
(Section 3.1.1)
Tree AND, OR Formal
Augmented attack trees
(Section 3.1.3)
Tree AND, OR Formal
Augmented vulnerabil-
ity trees (Section 3.1.2)
Tree AND, OR Informal
Bayesian attack graphs
(Section 3.2.4)
DAG
AND, OR, conditional
probabilities
Formal
Bayesian defense graphs
(Section 3.4.3)
DAG
AND, OR, conditional
probabilities
Formal
Bayesian networks for
security (Section 3.2.3)
DAG
AND, OR, conditional
probabilities
Formal
BDMPs (Section 3.2.3) DAG AND, OR, PAND, approx. OR, triggers Formal
Compromise graphs
(Section 3.2.5)
Unspecified None Formal
Countermeasure graphs
(Section 3.3.7)
DAG Countermeasures Informal
Cryptographic DAGs
(Section 3.2.1)
DAG Dependence edges Informal
Defense trees
(Section 3.3.2)
Tree AND, OR, counter leaves Semi-formal
Dynamic fault trees for
security (Section 3.2.8)
Tree AND, OR, PAND, SEQ, FDEP, CSP Informal
Enhanced attack trees
(Section 3.2.6)
Tree AND, OR, ordered-AND Formal
Extended fault trees
(Section 3.1.6)
Tree AND, OR, merge gates Formal
Fault trees for security
(Section 3.2.2)
Tree AND, OR, PAND, XOR, inhibit Informal
Improved attack trees
(Section 3.2.10)
Tree AND, OR, sequential AND Informal
Insecurity flows
(Section 3.4.1)
Unspecified None Formal
Intrusion DAGs
(Section 3.4.2)
DAG AND, OR Semi-formal
OWA trees
(Section 3.1.4)
Tree OWA operators Formal
Parallel model for
multi-parameter attack
trees (Section 3.1.5)
Tree AND, OR Formal
Protection trees
(Section 3.3.3)
Tree AND, OR Informal
Security activity graphs
(Section 3.3.4)
DAG AND, OR, split gate Semi-formal
Security goal indicator
trees (Section 3.4.4)
Tree
AND, OR, dependence
edge, specialization edge
Semi-formal
Security goal models
(Section 3.4.7)
DAG
AND, OR, dependence edge, informa-
tion edge
Formal
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Serial model for multi-
parameter attack trees
(Section 3.2.9)
Tree AND, OR, ordered leaves Formal
Unified parameterizable
attack trees
(Section 3.4.8)
Tree
AND, OR, PAND, time-based AND,
threshold AND
Formal
Vulnerability cause
graphs (Section 3.2.7)
DAG AND, OR, sequential AND Informal
Table 4: Aspects related to the formalism’s maturity and usability
Name of formalism
Tool
availability
Case study External use
Paper
count
Year
Anti-models
(Section 3.3.1)
No No No 3 2006
Attack countermeasure
trees (Section 3.3.5)
Prototype Real(istic) No 4 2010
Attack–defense trees
(Section 3.3.6)
Prototype Real(istic) Collaboration 6 2010
Attack-response trees
(Section 3.4.5)
Prototype Toy case study No 3 2009
Attack trees
(Section 3.1.1)
Commercial Real(istic) Independent > 100 1991
Augmented attack trees
(Section 3.1.3)
No Real(istic) Independent 6 2005
Augmented vulnerabil-
ity trees (Section 3.1.2)
No Real(istic) Independent 3 2003
Bayesian attack graphs
(Section 3.2.4)
Commercial Toy case study Independent 10 2005
Bayesian defense graphs
(Section 3.4.3)
Prototype Real(istic) No 5 2008
Bayesian networks for
security (Section 3.2.3)
Commercial Real(istic) Independent 14 2004
BDMPs (Section 3.4.6) Commercial Real(istic) Independent 5 2010
Compromise graphs
(Section 3.2.5)
No Real(istic) Collaboration 3 2006
Countermeasure graphs
(Section 3.3.7)
No Toy case study No 1 2010
Cryptographic DAGs
(Section 3.2.1)
No No No 1 1996
Defense trees
(Section 3.3.2)
No No No 3 2006
Dynamic fault trees for
security (Section 3.2.8)
No No No 1 2009
Enhanced attack trees
(Section 3.2.6)
No No No 1 2007
Extended fault trees
(Section 3.1.6)
No No No 1 2007
Fault trees for security
(Section 3.2.2)
Commercial Real(istic) Independent 3 2003
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Improved attack trees
(Section 3.2.10)
No No No 1 2011
Insecurity flows
(Section 3.4.1)
No No No 1 1997
Intrusion DAGs
(Section 3.4.2)
Prototype Real(istic) No 2 2003
OWA trees
(Section 3.1.4)
No No No 2 2005
Parallel model for
multi-parameter attack
trees (Section 3.1.5)
Prototype Real(istic) Collaboration 5 2006
Protection trees
(Section 3.3.3)
No Toy case study No 4 2006
Security activity graphs
(Section 3.3.4)
Prototype Real(istic) No 2 2006
Security goal indicator
trees (Section 3.4.4)
Prototype Real(istic) No 3 2008
Security goal models
(Section 3.4.7)
No Real(istic) No 2 2010
Serial model for multi-
parameter attack trees
(Section 3.2.9)
Prototype No No 3 2010
Unified parameterizable
attack trees
(Section 3.4.8)
No No No 1 2011
Vulnerability cause
graphs (Section 3.2.7)
Commercial Real(istic) Independent 4 2006
5 Alternative Methodologies
We close this survey with a short overview of alternative methodologies for security modeling and
analysis. The formalisms described here are outside the main scope of this paper, because they
were not originally introduced for the purposes of attack and defense modeling or they are not
based on the DAG structure. However, for the sake of completeness, we find important to briefly
present those approaches as well. The objective of this section is to give pointers to other existing
methodological tools for security assessment, rather than to perform a thorough overview of all
related formalisms. This explains why the description of the formalisms given here is less complete
and structured than the information provided in Section 3.
5.1 Petri Nets for Security
In the mid 1990s, models based on Petri nets have been applied for security analysis [52, 139].
In 1994, Kumar and Spafford [139] adopted colored Petri nets for security modeling. They illustrate
how to model reference scenarios for an intrusion detection device. Also in 1994, Dacier [52] used
Petri nets in his Ph.D. thesis as part of a larger quantification model that describes the progress of
an attacker taking over a system. A useful property of Petri nets is their great modeling capability
and in particular their ability to take into account the sequential aspect of attacks, the modeling
of concurrent action and various forms of dependency. Petri nets are widely used and have various
specific extensions. To corroborate this statement, we list a few existing ones. Kumar and Spafford’s
work relies on colored Petri nets [139], Dacier’s on stochastic Petri nets [52], McDermott’s on
disjunctive Petri nets [162], Horvath and Dörges’ on reference nets [101], Dalton II et al.’s on
generalized stochastic Petri nets [57], Pudar et al.’s on deterministic time transition Petri nets [216]
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and Xu and Nygard’s on aspect-oriented Petri nets [295]. Several articles on Petri nets merge the
formalism with other approaches. Horvath and Dörges combine Petri nets with the concept of
security patterns [101] while Dalton II et al. [57], and more thoroughly Pudar et al. [216], combine
Petri nets and attack trees.
In 1994, Dacier embedded Petri nets into a higher level formalism called privilege graphs. They
model an attacker’s progress in obtaining access rights for a desired target [52, 53]. In a privilege
graph, a node represents a set of privileges and an edge a method for transferring these privileges
to the attacker. This corresponds to the exploitation of a vulnerability. The model includes an
attacker’s “memory” which forbids him to go through privilege states that he has already acquired.
In addition, an attacker’s “good sense” is modeled which prevents him from regressing. In [54],
Dacier et al. proposed to transform a privilege graph into Markov chain corresponding to all
possible successful attack scenarios. The method has been applied to help system administrators
to monitor the security of their systems.
In [297], Zakzewska and Ferragut presented a model extending Petri nets in order to model
real-time cyber conflicts. This formalism is able to represent situational awareness, concurrent ac-
tions, incomplete information and objective functions. Since it makes use of stochastic transitions,
it is well suited to reason about stochastic non-controlled events. The formalism is used to run
simulations of cyber attacks in order to experimentally analyze cyber conflicts. The authors also
performed a comparison of their extended Petri nets model with other security modeling tech-
niques. In particular, they showed that extended Petri nets are more readable and more expressive
than attack graphs, especially with respect to the completeness of the models.
5.2 Attack Graphs
The term attack graph has been first introduced by Phillips and Swiler [205, 256] in 1998, and
has extensively been used ever since. The nodes of an attack graph represent possible states of a
system during the attack. The edges correspond to changes of states due to an attacker’s actions.
An attack graph is generated automatically based on three types of inputs: attack templates
(generic representations of attacks including required conditions), a detailed description of the
system to be attacked (topology, configurations of components, etc.), and the attacker’s profile
(his capability, his tools, etc.). Quantifications, such as average probabilities or time to success,
can be deduced by giving weight to the edges and by finding shortest paths in the graph.
Starting in 2002, Sheyner [238,239] made extensive contributions to popularize attack graphs
by associating them with model checking techniques. To limit the risk of combinatorial explosion,
a large number of methods were developed. Ammann et al. [8] restricted the graphs by exploiting
a monotony property, thereby eliminating backtracking in terms of privilege escalation. Noel and
Jajodia [110,191] took configuration aspects into account. A complete state of the art concerning
the contributions to the field between 2002 and 2005 can be found in [150]. In 2006, Wang et
al. introduced a relational model for attack graphs [283]. The approach facilitates interactive
analysis of the models and improves its performance. Ou et al. [197] optimized the generation
and representation of attack graphs by transforming them into logical attack graphs of polynomial
size with respect to the number of components of the computer network analyzed. During the
same year, Ingols et al. [105] proposed multiple-prerequisite graphs, which also severely reduce the
complexity of the graphs. In [170], Mehta et al. proposed an algorithm for classification of states
in order to identify the most relevant parts of an attack graph. In 2008, Malhotra et al. [153]
did the same based on the notion of attack surface described in [155]. The vast majority of the
authors mentioned have also worked on visualization aspects [100, 189, 190, 290]. Kotenko and
Stepashkin [137] described a complete software platform for implementing concepts and metrics of
attack graphs. On a theoretical level, Braynov and Jadliwala [28] extended the model with several
attackers.
Starting in 2003, the problem of quantitative assessment of the security of networked systems
using attack graphs has been extensively studied [191, 279–282]. The work presented in [191]
and [280] focuses on minimal cost of removing vulnerabilities in hardening a network. In [281],
the authors introduced a metric, called attack resistance, which is used to compare the security of
33
different network configurations. The approach was then extended in [282] into a general abstract
framework for measuring various aspects of network security. In [279], Wang et al. introduced a
metric incorporating probabilities of the existence of the vulnerabilities considered in the graph.
In his master thesis, Louthan IV [109] proposed extensions to the attack graph modeling
framework to permit modeling continuous, in addition to discrete, system elements and their in-
teractions. In [279], Wang et al. addressed the problem of likelihood quantification of potential
multi-step attacks on networked environments, that combine multiple vulnerabilities. They de-
veloped an attack graph-based probabilistic metric for network security and proposed heuristics
for efficient computation. In [192], Noel et al. used attack graphs to understand how different
vulnerabilities can be combined to form an attack on a network. They simulated incremental net-
work penetration and assessed the overall security of a network system by propagating attack
likelihoods. The method allows to give scores to risk mitigation options in terms of maximizing
security and minimizing cost. It can be used to study cost/benefit trade-offs for analyzing return
on security investment.
Dawkins and Hale [62] developed a concept similar to attack graphs called attack chains. The
model is based on a deductive tree structure approach but also allows for inductive reasoning
using goal-inducing attack chains, to extract scenarios leading to a given aim. These models are
also capable of generating attack trees, which may be quantified by conventional methods. Aspects
concerning software implementation are described in [49].
5.3 Approaches Derived from UML Diagrams
We start this section with a short description of two formalisms derived from UML diagrams,
namely abuse cases of McDermott and Fox [163] andmisuse cases of Sindre and Opdahl [5,244–247]
which were later extended by Røstad in [222]. These techniques are not specifically intended to
model attacks but rather to capture threats and abusive behavior which have to be taken into
account when eliciting security requirements (for misuse cases) as well as for design and testing
(for abuse cases). The flexibility of misuse and abuse cases allows for expressive graphical modeling
of attack scenarios without mathematical formalization that supports quantification.
In [85], Firesmith argues that misuse and abuse cases are “highly effective ways of analyzing
security threats but are inappropriate for the analysis and specification of security requirements”.
The reasoning is that misuse cases focus on how misusers can successfully attack the system.
Thus they often model specific architectural mechanisms and solutions, e.g., the use of passwords,
rather than actual security requirements, e.g., authentication mechanisms. To specify security
requirements, he suggested to use security use cases. Security use cases focus on how an application
achieves its goals. According to Firesmith, they provide “a highly-reusable way of organizing,
analyzing, and specifying security requirements” [85].
Diallo et al. presented a comparative evaluation of the common criteria [1], misuse cases, and
attack trees [67]. Opdahl and Sindre [194] compared usability aspects and modeling features of
misuse cases and attack trees. UML-based approaches can be combined with other types of models.
The combination of misuse cases and attack trees appears not only to be simple but also useful
and relevant [172, 262]. In [120], Kárpáti et al. adapted use case maps to security as misuse case
maps. Katta et al. [123] combined UML sequence diagrams with misuse cases in a new formalism
called misuse sequence diagrams. A misuse sequence diagram represents a sequence of attacker
interactions with system components and depicts how the components were misused over time by
exploiting their vulnerabilities. The authors of [123] performed usability and performance com-
parison of misuse sequence diagrams and misuse case maps. In [204], Kárpáti et al. integrated
five different representation techniques in a method called hacker attack representation method
(HARM). The methodologies used in HARM are: attack sequence descriptions (summarizing at-
tacks in natural language), misuse case maps (depicting the system architecture targeted by the
attack and visualizing the traces of the exploits), misuse case diagrams (showing threats in re-
lation to the wanted functionality) attack trees (representing the hierarchical relation between
attacks) and attack patterns (describing an attack in detail by adding information about context
and solutions). Combining such diverse representation techniques has two goals. First, it provides
34
“an integrated view of security attacks and system architecture”. Second, the HARM method is
especially well suited in involving different stakeholders, including non-technical people preferring
informal representations.
In [243], Sindre adapted UML activity diagrams to security. The resultingmal-activity diagrams
constitute an alternative for misuse cases when the author considers the latter to be unsuitable.
This is for instance the case in situations where a large numbers of interactions need to be specified
within a or outside a system. Case studies mainly concern social engineering attacks [121].
5.4 Isolated models
In this section we gather a number of isolated models. Most of them contain cycles and therefore
are outside of the main scope of this paper. However, we mention them because they build upon
a formalism described in Section 3.
The stratified node topology was proposed by Daley et al. [55] as an extension of attack trees,
in 2002. The formalism consists of a directed graph which is aimed at providing a context sen-
sitive attack modeling framework. It supports incident correlation, analysis and prediction and
extends attack trees by separating the nodes into three distinct classes based on their function-
ality: event-level nodes, state-level nodes and top-level nodes. The directed edges between the
nodes are classified into implicit and explicit links. Implicit links allow individual nodes to imply
other nodes in the tree; explicit links are created when an attack provides a capability to execute
additional nodes, but does not actually invoke a new instance of a node. As in attack trees, the set
of linked nodes can be connected disjunctively as well as conjunctively. In comparison with attack
trees, the authors drop the requirement of a designated root node, along with the requirement
that the graphs have to be acyclic. Due to the functional distinction of the nodes, the stratified
node topology can keep the vertical ordering, even if the modeled scenario is cyclic.
In 2010, Abdulla et al. [2] described a model called attack jungles. When trying to use attack
trees as formalized by Mauw and Oostdijk in [161] to illustrate the security of a GSM radio
network, the authors of [2] encountered modeling problems related to the presence of cycles as well
as analysis problems related to reusability of nodes in real life scenarios. This led them to propose
attack jungles, which extend attack trees with multiple roots, reusable nodes and cycles that allow
for modeling of attacks which depend on each other. Attack jungles are formalized as multigraphs
and their formal semantics extend the semantics based on multisets proposed in [161]. In order to
find possible ways of attacking a system, a backwards reachability algorithm for analysis of attack
jungles was described. Moreover, the notion of an attribute domain for quantitative analysis, as
proposed for attack trees in [161], is extended to fit the new structure of attack jungles. By dividing
attack components (nodes) into reusable and not reusable ones, it is possible to reason about and
better analyze realistic scenarios. For instance, in an attack jungle a component used once can be
reused multiple times without inducing any extra cost.
Extended influence diagrams [114] form another related formalism which is not based on a DAG
structure. Extended influence diagrams are built upon influence diagrams, introduced by Matheson
and Howard in the 1960s [160], which, in turn, are an extension of Bayesian networks. Influence
diagrams are also known as relevance diagrams, decision diagrams or decision networks and are
used to provide a high-level visualization of decision problems under uncertainty [82]. Extended
influence diagrams allow to model the relationships between decisions, events and outcomes of an
enterprise architecture. They employ the following three types of node: ellipses which represent
events (also known as chance nodes), rectangles which depict decision nodes and diamonds which
represent utility nodes (or outcomes). In addition the formalism allows to specify how a node
is defined, how well it can be controlled and how the nodes relate to each other. The latter is
achieved with different types of edges. Moreover, transformation rules between graphs govern
switching between different levels of abstraction of a scenario (expanding and collapsing). The
rules also ensure that graphs do not contradict each other. In [140], the authors show how to elicit
knowledge from scientific texts, generating extended influence diagrams and in [76] the authors
outline how extended influence diagrams can be used for cyber security management.
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6 Conclusion
This work presents a complete and methodical overview of DAG-based techniques for modeling at-
tack and defense scenarios. Some of the described methodologies have extensively been studied and
are widely used to support security and risk assessment processes. Others emerged from specific,
practical developments and have remained isolated methods. This survey provides a structured
description of the existing formalisms, gives pointers to related papers, tools and projects, and
proposes a general classification of the presented approaches. To classify the formalisms, we have
used 13 aspects concerning graphical, formal and usability characteristics of the analyzed models.
Two general trends can be observed in the field of graphical security modeling: unification
and specification. The objective of the methodologies developed within the first trend is to unify
existing approaches and propose general solutions that can be used for analysis of a broad spectrum
of security scenarios. The corresponding formalisms are well suited for reasoning about situations
involving diversified aspects, such as digital, physical and social components, simultaneously. Such
models usually have sound formal foundations and are extensively studied from a theoretical
point of view. They are augmented with formal semantics and a general mathematical framework
for quantitative analysis. Examples of such models developed within the unification trend are
attack–defense trees, unified parameterizable attack trees, multi-parameter attack trees, OWA
trees, Bayesian attack graphs, and Bayesian defense graphs.
The second observed trend, i.e., the specification trend, aims at developing methodologies
for addressing domain specific security problems. Studied domains include intrusion detection
(e.g., attack-response trees, intrusion DAGs), secure software development (e.g., security activity
graphs, security goal indicator trees), and security requirements engineering (e.g., anti-models).
Formalisms developed within this trend are often based on empirical studies and practical needs.
They concentrate on domain specific metrics, such as the response index, which is used for the
analysis of intrusion DAGs. These approaches often remain isolated and seldom relate to or build
upon other existing approaches.
The multitude of methodologies presented in this survey shows that graphical security modeling
is a young but very rapidly growing area. Thus, further development is necessary and new directions
need to be explored before security assessment can fully benefit from graphical models. One of
the research questions which has not yet received enough attention is building graphical models
from pre-existing attack templates and patterns. Addressing this question would make automatic
model creation possible and replace the tedious, error-prone, manual construction process. It would
therefore strongly relieve the industrial sector when building large-scale practical models.
The idea of reusing attack patterns is not new. It has already been mentioned in 2001 by Moore
et al. [178]. An excellent initiative was taken by the FP7 project SHIELDS [241], in which the
Security Vulnerability Repository Service (SVRS) has been developed. The SVRS is an on-line
library of various security models including attack trees [242]. A natural follow-up step would
be to propose methods for automatic or semi-automatic construction of complex, specific models
from general attack or vulnerability patterns. This would require developing algorithms for correct
composition and comparison of models, standardizing employed node labels and introducing an
agent-based view into the formalisms.
Using security patterns makes threat analysis more efficient and accurate. First generating a
general model from existing libraries constitutes a good starting point for further model refinement
and analysis. Furthermore, although new technological opportunities arise every day, empirical
studies show that most attackers reuse the same attack vectors with little or no modification.
Often the same company is attacked several times by an intruder exploiting the same already
known vulnerability.
There still exists a gap between theoretical research and practical employment of graphical
security models. Tighter interaction between the scientific and industrial security communities
would be very beneficial for the future of the field. Setting up dedicated events, such as work-
shops, conferences or panel discussions, would provide a platform for the exchange of ideas, closer
collaboration and a faster dissemination of results. This would allow practitioners to better under-
stand the capabilities of theoretical models and give scientists an opportunity to learn what the
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practical and industrial needs are. Once a bridge between the two communities is built, a natural
next step will be to include graphical models into standardized and commonly used auditing and
risk assessment tools and practices. Due to the sound formal foundations of the graphical mod-
els as well as their user friendliness, this would greatly improve the quality and usability of the
currently used, mostly table-based, practical risk and auditing methodologies.
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